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‘Our Republic and its press will rise or fall together. An able, disinterested, public-
spirited press, with trained intelligence to know the right and the courage to do it, 
can preserve that public virtue without which popular government is a sham and a 
mockery… The power to mould the future of the Republic will be in the hands of the 
journalists of future generations.’1  
At the core of this research lies two competing rights: the right to freedom of 
expression and the right to confidentiality (which is one of the rights entailed by 
the right to privacy). Both are rights which are entrenched in the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the ‘Constitution’) and both are 
rights which are fiercely guarded.  
It was inevitable that these rights would clash when they met – the underlying 
values they seek to protect are diametrically opposed. The right to free expression 
protects the underlying values of free and frank debate, the promotion of 
openness, transparency and accountability and freedom of information, among 
others. The right to privacy, on the other hand, protects maintaining 
confidentiality and protecting information from being disseminated. In the 
asylum-seeking context, the right to confidentiality specifically protects the lives 
of asylum-seekers, their families and associates and the integrity of the asylum 
system, amongst others.2 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to examine the two opposing rights through 
three different lenses. First, the jurisprudential lens will examine the 
underpinnings of each right and their relative importance. Next, the judgments 
lens will examine how each right was dealt with in the matters before the High 
Court and the Constitutional Court. Finally, the comparative lens will examine 
how the rights have been dealt with in foreign law in the asylum systems of New 
Zealand and Canada. The aim of this thesis is to guide the Refugee Appeals 
Authority (‘RAA’)3 in exercising its new discretion by looking through each lens 
to determine how the opposing rights can, and should, be balanced. 
                                                          
1 Joseph Pulitzer, The North American Review, May 1904, p. 60. 
2 See the full discussion on both the rights of free expression and privacy in Chapter 2. 
3 Section 21(5) of the Refugees Act, 130 of 1998 provides that the RAA is the body tasked with 
deciding whether to grant applications to attend or report on its hearings on asylum applications by the 
media or any person. 
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The backdrop of this research is in the decision by the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa in 2013 in the case of Mail and Guardian Media Limited and 
Others v Chipu N.O. and Others4 (hereafter referred to as ‘Chipu’). It is a 
landmark judgment which considers the intersection of the right of 
confidentiality and the right to free expression in South Africa in the context of 
refugee law. 
In Chipu, both the High Court and the Constitutional Court dealt with the 
constitutionality of section 21(5) of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 (hereafter the 
‘Refugees Act’)5. This section provided for the strict confidentiality of asylum 
applications and the information contained therein and prevented any member of 
the public or the media from attending asylum application proceedings or 
viewing the asylum application and supporting documents.6   
The offending provision was challenged by Mail and Guardian Media Limited, 
Independent Newspapers (Proprietary) Limited and Media 24 Limited 
(collectively, the applicants) on the ground that the section unjustifiably limited 
the right to freedom of expression. The applicants challenged the provision when 
they attempted to gain access to the proceedings of the Refugee Appeal Board (as 
it then was).7 The particular RAB proceedings they sought access to were the 
application proceedings before the RAB of the Czech national Radovan Krejčíř, 
who was then seeking asylum in South Africa.8   
The Constitutional Court held that the section was unconstitutional after 
balancing the rights to free expression and the right to confidentiality and 
                                                          
4 Mail and Guardian Media Limited and Others v Chipu N.O. and Others [2013] ZACC 32 (‘Chipu’). 
5 Refugees Act 130 of 1998 (‘Refugees Act’). 
6 Media summary of Chipu supra, Available at www.saflii.org.za/cases/ZACC/.../32.html. Accessed on 
12 May 2014. 
7 The definition of the ‘Refugee Appeal Board’ (‘RAB’) was deleted by section 54 of the Immigration 
Act, 13 of 2002. Section 21(5) of the Refugees Act, 130 of 1998 now refers to the ‘Refugee Appeals 
Authority’ (‘RAA’) which is not defined in either the Refugees Act or the Immigration Act. 
Throughout this thesis, where reference is made to the RAB, this is with reference to the RAB as it 
then was, particularly when referring to the cases before the High Court and Constitutional Court as 
the RAB was the party involved. When reference is made to the RAA, it refers to the current structure 
or body which is now responsible for the operation of section 21(5) of the Refugees Act. 
8 K Maughn “The Magical Slippery Man, Radovan Krejčíř”, Daily Maverick. April 17, 2012. 
Available at http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-04-17-the-magical-slippery-man-radovan-
Krejcir/#.Ula_iEKfuRI. Accessed on 12 May 2014. 
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conducting a limitations analysis under section 369 of the Constitution.10 In the 
result, the Constitutional Court declared section 21(5) of the Refugees Act 
invalid. 
Following the order of the Constitutional Court in Chipu,11 the legislature duly 
revised and adopted an amended section 21(5) of the Refugees Act. The 
Refugees Amendment Act 10 of 2015 amends section 21(5) and the provision 
exactly mirrors the interim provision crafted by the Constitutional Court in the 
Chipu order.  
Although the standard of confidentiality in asylum applications is maintained, the 
section now allows for the RAA to allow access to, or reporting on, its hearings 
upon application by the media or any person.12 The RAA's decision to allow 
access to its proceedings is dependent upon its consideration of a number of 
factors. Chiefly, the RAA must weigh the public interest in allowing access to the 
press and/or the public on the one hand against the rights of the asylum seeker to 
confidentiality and protection of the integrity of the asylum-seeking process on 
the other hand.13 
Post-Chipu, and at the time of writing, this revised section has not been litigated 
or challenged in any reported case. 
The amended section 21(5) gives rise to unchartered territory: a new discretion 
for the RAA to exercise; a new portal of access for the media; a new duty for the 
media to consider how to report on asylum issues in light of the information they 
are now able to access; and the repercussions of media access and media reports 
on asylum seekers, their families and associates.  
Given that South Africa's refugee protection system is still in its nascent stage of 
development, only commencing after the demise of the apartheid regime in the 
early 1990s14, it is to be expected that these issues have not been subject to much 
interrogation domestically.  
                                                          
9 Section 36 of the Constitution provides for the limitation of rights entrenched in Chapter 2, the Bill 
of Rights. 
10 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the ‘Constitution’). 
11 Chipu supra at para 115. 
12 Section 21(5) of the Refugees Act. 
13 Ibid. 
14 TH Schreier A critical examination of South Africa's application of the expanded OAU refugee 
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Although domestic law is well-developed on the individual rights of free 
expression and confidentiality in case law, statute and policy documents, these 
sources, although instructive, are limited in their application in the context of 
refugee law. There is therefore an argument that regard ought to be had to foreign 
law on this issue, which could be instructive in this context. 
Having regard to the revised section 21(5) of the Refugees Act, and having 
regard to the dearth of domestic case law and academic opinion on this issue, the 
principle aim of this research is to formulate an understanding the importance of 
free expression in the context of asylum proceedings. 
This research will be structured as follows. First, there will be a jurisprudential 
discussion of the right to free expression to understand its import, looking to 
domestic case law and academic text. In this context, the right to confidentiality 
will be discussed to understand the contrast between the two rights. Then, briefly, 
the right to free expression in the asylum-seeking process in international refugee 
law and regional refugee law will be discussed. Next, the Chipu case will be 
analysed through its entire judicial process, as the first and only domestic case to 
have grappled with the right to free expression in the context of refugee law.  
Finally, there will be an analysis of foreign law decisions in New Zealand and 
Canada on the right to free expression in the context of refugee law and how 
"RAA-equivalent" bodies in those jurisdictions exercised their discretion to allow 
entry to the press.  
Finally, this research will conclude that, despite the relative dearth of domestic 
academic opinion and case law on the right to free expression in the context of 
seeking asylum, there is sufficient guidance for the RAA to exercise its discretion 
if it has regard to the wealth of knowledge on the individual rights and if it looks 
to foreign law where there are lacunae.  
In sum, this aspect of domestic jurisprudence requires clarity, which will 
necessarily develop through the testing of the right in the context of refugee law. 
Until this area of law is further developed, there is an argument to be made that 
there is sufficient available guidance to enable the RAA to reach an informed 
                                                          
definition: Is adequate protection being offered within the meaning of the 1969 OAU 
Refugee Convention? LLM (UCT) (2008) 3. 
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decision when exercising its discretion to allow the press access to its 
proceedings. It is hoped that this research will aid in forming an understanding of 




II. A jurisprudential examination of the rights 
(i) Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse a few key features of the right to free 
expression and the right to privacy both generally and specifically in the context 
of refugee law.  
This chapter will cover the levels of protection of the right to free expression; the 
jurisprudential purpose of the right to free expression; the link between the right 
to free expression and the right to receive information and ideas; and the 
importance of media freedom.  
Next, this chapter will describe the levels of protection of the right to 
confidentiality and privacy; the jurisprudential purpose of the right to 
confidentiality in the asylum-seeking process and the potential for abuse of the 
asylum-seeking process by the media.  
For the purposes of this chapter, the constitutional right to privacy will be 
discussed to form the general jurisprudential basis of the asylum seeker’s right to 
confidentiality, as the right to confidentiality is entailed by the right to privacy. 
As the right to confidentiality is ultimately the right which is protected by section 
21(5) of the Refugees Act, this is the right which will form the bulk of the 
discussion on the issue, and will thus be referred to and discussed in favour of the 
right to privacy. 
Given the relative dearth of information and writing available domestically on the 
right to free expression in the context of refugee law, the discussion on the right 
in that context is succinct.  
(ii) The right to freedom of expression  
This is a right framed dually as an intrinsic right (that is, a right in itself), and as 
an instrumental right (that is, a right which provides for the exercise of other 
rights). Although section 21(5) of the Refugees Act15 allows both the media and 
the public access to RAA hearings, for the purposes of this thesis, the arguments 
made will be mainly confined to media access. 
                                                          
15 Refugees Act 130 of 1998.  
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Though public access to RAA hearings will not be the focus of this research, the 
public remain an important stakeholder in the RAA process. Through the 
exercise of the right to free expression by the media, the public can exercise their 
constitutionally entrenched right to freedom of information. 
The core of the right to free expression is discussed first and it is followed by a 
more detailed discussion on the right to free expression as it is relevant for the 
media and for the public respectively.  
a) Levels of protection 
The right is found in, and protected by, domestic, regional and international 
instruments and enshrined in legal texts by most countries.16  
At the international level, it is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR)17 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).18 The similarly-worded provisions extend the right to everyone, which 
right includes the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of 
all kinds, regardless of frontiers, through many means.19  
Regionally, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)20  
provides for the right in Article 13 and it echoes the provisions of the UDHR, 
ICCPR and other two regional instruments which precede it.21  
Domestically, section 16 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right 
to freedom of expression, which includes press freedom and the freedom to 
receive or impart information or ideas.22  
                                                          
16 At last count, 168 states were party to the ICCPR, though certain countries have entered into 
reservations on Article 19, which protects free expression, such as the Netherlands, Australia and 
Belgium, which limits the scope of the right as it appears in the ICCPR text. Available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en. Accessed on 26 May 2014.  
17 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217A (III), 
10 December 1948 (‘UDHR’). 
18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution 2200 A 
(XXI), 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976 (‘ICCPR’).  
19 Articles 19 of the UDHR and Articles 19(2) of the ICCPR.  
20 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Adopted 26 June 1981, entered into force 21 
October 1986. 
21 The European Convention on Human Rights (Adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 
September 1953) and the American Convention on Human Rights (Adopted 22 November 1969, 
entered into force 18 July 1978).  
22 Section 16 (1) (a)-(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
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b) The instrumentality argument 
Thomas Emerson, a leading American academic on the right to free expression, 
suggests four reasons for the protection of the right –  
1. it allows for self-actualisation, as citizens voice their opinion on the 
matters concerning themselves and the state; 
2. it aids the quest for truth which is essential to the creation of an open, 
transparent and accountable government; 
3. it allows for meaningful social commentary and engagement with the state, 
essential to participatory democracies; 
4. it promotes social cohesion and fosters a nation that can rationally engage, 
despite differing opinions.23  
He divides the right into two forms of conduct: expression and action. Whilst 
expression is entitled to complete protection against government infringement, he 
argues that action is subject to reasonable regulation designed to achieve a 
legitimate social objective.24 The basis of the division lies in his argument that 
there is no inherent harm in an expression, but rather from the ensuing action.25  
Emerson’s argument that expression is entitled to complete protection against 
infringement is untenable in the South African context. He does, however, make 
valuable points on the purposes underlying the right. 
Emerson’s writings must be analysed contextually – he writes with the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution as his principle legislative piece, 
which enshrines the right to freedom of expression. 26 The right to free expression 
is strongly protected in the United States, and the United States Supreme Court 
has characterised freedom of expression as a ‘preferred right’. However, some 
                                                          
23 T Emerson The System of Freedom of Expression (1970) 6 -7.  
24 T Emerson ‘Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression’ (1964) 74 The Yale Law Journal 
1 at 21.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid.  
Further, given the fact that the United States’ constitution has no limitations clause, the scope of the 
rights enshrined in it are limited definitionally. This is in contrast to South Africa, where the 
Constitution does contain a limitations clause, allowing for the justifiable limitation of any right 
contained therein.  
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forms of speech such as defamation, fighting words and obscenity fall outside the 
protection of the First Amendment.27 
In South Africa, the suggestion made by Emerson regarding the weight of the 
right and its limitation is untenable – no right is capable of complete protection 
without limitation. South Africa is a nation built on the equal protection and 
respect of all rights that are constitutionally entrenched. The right to free 
expression can be limited where the limitation meets the criteria set out in the 
limitations clause of the Constitution28 – then it is legally permissible for the 
expression to be limited.  
Further, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides for categories 
of expression which are not protected under section 16(2), and which are not 
permitted under the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act, 4 of 2000 which was passed to give effect to (amongst 
others) section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution. These provisions prohibit hate speech 
and expressions which are unfairly discriminatory. The import of this is that an 
expression, in and of itself, can be harmful. Thus, Emerson’s assertion that an 
expression cannot be inherently harmful cannot be imported into domestic law. 
It can be seen that two aims of the right as stated by Emerson apply directly to 
the media.29  Freedom of the media undeniably aids the quest for truth and 
provides not only a platform for citizens to voice opinions on state matters, but 
also allows citizens necessary exposure to information required for meaningful 
social commentary. This is crucial to the pursuit of an enhanced, accountable and 
transparent government and to the pursuit of a participatory democracy where all 
citizens are active and involved, having access to information and platforms to 
share their views. 
Emerson’s writings link to the propositions of Richard Dworkin, an American 
jurist, who suggests that free expression is both an instrumental right and an end 
in itself, as it is a right that is required in every modern legal society.30 In keeping 
                                                          
27 Van Vollenhoven ‘The Right to Freedom of Expression: The Mother of our Democracy’ (2015) 
18(6) PER/PELJ 2305 
28 Section 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
29 Section 16(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
30 D Davis ‘Freedom of Expression’ in H. Cheadle, D.M. Davis and N.R.L Haysom (eds) South 
African Constitutional Law: Bill of Rights 2nd ed (2011) 11-3.  
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the citizenry of the country abreast of current local, regional and global news, the 
media is instrumentally providing for the full realisation of the public’s right to 
free expression.  
Richard Stone identifies three main arguments for the right that appears to be of 
particular importance, given its inclusion in early constitutional documents.31 He 
puts them forward as the arguments from truth, self-fulfilment and democracy.  
Stone cites John Stuart Mill’s writings (as does Emerson, who also identifies the 
emergence of truth as an integral factor of the right to free expression) as the 
basis to the argument that there is no monopoly on truth, that the views of the 
minority should not be suppressed where they are contrary to those of the 
majority.32 Mill does, however, allow for derogation from this rule: where it may 
lead to direct harm to others. This is what, in essence, informs the argument made 
by proponents of confidentiality of asylum applications.  
Stone’s arguments, which base the right on self-fulfilment and democracy, are 
reflected in the writings of Emerson and Dworkin as an instrumental right which 
fosters meaningful participation and an active, informed citizenry.  
The writings of Emerson, Dworkin, Stone and Mill all point to the importance of 
free expression of the media for several underlying reasons. The recurring themes 
of fostering meaningful engagement by the public; the pursuit of participatory 
democracy; and the desire for accountable and transparent governance are all 
valuable and worthwhile outcomes to justify the protection of the right to free 
expression.  
However worthwhile the outcomes, however, the extent to which the right is 
protected cannot be absolute, as Emerson suggests. The right can and should be 
justifiably limited, and Mill identifies an important instance where this is so – 
where the exercise of the right causes harm to another. Thus, where the exercise 
of the right to free expression causes more harm by its exercise than the good it 
achieves, the exercise of the right should be limited. This thinking would seem to 
underlie the limitations clause and the internal limitations of section 16 and 
PEPUDA.  
                                                          
31 R Stone Textbook on Civil Liberties and Human Rights 6th ed (2006) 283.  
32 Stone op cit 284.  
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I support the argument that free expression is of vital importance to society, but 
where the exercise of the right causes more harm than good, it should be limited. 
As a starting point, however, the scope of the outcomes the right seeks to achieve 
must be borne in mind when it is, or must be, limited. The principles that underlie 
the right affect society as a whole, and implicate several fundamental pillars of a 
democracy.  
These are important fundamental principles which would be compromised, and 
the impact of the limitation would be vast, if the media were unable to exercise 
the right to free expression. Thus, when the right to free expression is, or must be, 
limited, the authority should bear in mind the scope of the harm that would be 
caused by stifling free expression, taking into account the gravity of the 
principles and rights being affected and the breadth of its effect on society. 
c) The right to receive information and ideas  
Section 16 of the Constitution provides for press and media freedom and the right 
to impart information and ideas.33 The concomitant right in the same section is 
the right to receive these ideas and information.  
While the media has the right to impart the information and ideas gained through 
their access to RAA hearings, this is only permissible in certain instances, 
according to the amended section 21(5) of the Refugees Act34.  The amended 
section provides that other than the asylum seeker granting consent, the RAA can 
allow access to its hearings where it deems that it is in the public interest to do 
so. Thus, the argument which should be utilised by the media (or the public) is 
that the proceedings are in the public interest. 
While the public interest ground upon which the press rely for access attempts to 
give effect to the right to free expression, it also restricts the scope of the right.  
Access will only be granted and information imparted (by the press to the public, 
where the press has sought access) only if it is in the public interest.  
                                                          
33 Section 16 (1)(a)-(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.  
34 Act 130 of 1998.  
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Inexorably tied to the constitutional duty of the press to ‘inform citizens and 
provide a platform for the exchange of ideas’35 is the right of the public to be 
informed about these issues – the right of the public to know.  
The defence of public interest can be raised for this very reason – that the public 
have a constitutional right to be informed of and about the matters that concern 
(or should concern) them.  
The case of Midi Television (Pty) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecution (Western 
Cape)36 reiterates the importance of citizens keeping themselves informed of the 
issues that are ‘vital to open, responsive and transparent government in a 
democracy’37 as an exercise of their duty as a citizen of South Africa.  
d) The right to press freedom 
The right to press freedom is brought to the fore by Judith Lichtenberg, who 
echoes the arguments made by Emerson, Dworkin and Stone, stating that 
‘freedom of the press in democratic societies is… essential, it is thought, to 
individual autonomy and self-expression.’38  
The right of press freedom is especially important in South Africa, given the 
history of the media being used as the mouthpiece of the apartheid government 
and the widespread suppression of the truth of apartheid and opposition 
movements during that period by the government.39  
Wasserman and de Beer argue that the Bill of Rights can be seen as the most 
important legislative change influencing the operation of the media in post-
                                                          
35 J Stevenson ‘Reformulation of Sub Judice Rule and Prior Restraint of Publication Resolved: A 
Victory for Press Freedom (Midi Television (Pty) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecution (Western 
Cape) 2007 9 BCLR 958 (SCA))’ (2007) 28 Obiter 614 at 617.  
36 Midi Television (Pty) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecution (Western Cape) 2007 9 BCLR 958 
(SCA).  
37 Stevenson op cit 618.  
38 J Lichtenberg, ‘Foundations and Limits of Freedom of the Press’ (1987) 16 Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 329 at 329.  
39 ANC, Strategy and Tactics: As amended at the 50th National Conference, December 1997 
(Johannesburg: www.anc.org.za), quoted in Hermann Giliomee, James Myburgh and Lawrence 
Schlemmer (2001) ‘Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa’, 
Democratization, 8:1, 168. 
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apartheid society.40 Wasserman states that media freedom is coupled with 
responsibility, often framed in terms of the ‘watchdog function’ of the media.41  
South African case law further entrenches the importance of media freedom in 
several landmark cases. In Khumalo v Holomisa42, the Constitutional Court held 
that the media play an influential role in a democracy as they have a 
constitutional obligation to inform citizens and provide a platform for the 
exchange of ideas. Cameron J in Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Limited43 stated 
‘the success of our constitutional venture depends upon robust criticism of the 
exercise of power. This requires alert and critical citizens. But strong and 
independent newspapers, journals and broadcast media are needed, if those 
criticisms are to be effectively voiced, and if they are to be informed of the 
factual content and critical perspectives that investigative journalism may 
provide.’44 
The Constitutional Court acknowledged in Chipu that the media plays a ‘key role 
in society and is not only protected by the right to freedom of expression but is 
also a key facilitator and guarantor of the right’45. The Court also agreed with the 
Khumalo judgment, which stated that ‘the media are important agents in ensuring 
that government is open, responsive and accountable to the people as the 
founding values of our Constitution require.’46 The Khumalo judgment goes on to 
state:  
‘In a democratic society, then, the mass media play a role of undeniable 
importance. They bear an obligation to provide citizens both with information 
and with a platform for the exchange of ideas which is crucial to the 
development of a democratic culture. As primary agents of the dissemination 
of information and ideas, they are, inevitably, extremely powerful institutions 
in a democracy and they have a constitutional duty to act with vigour, 
courage, integrity and responsibility.’ 
The Constitutional Court also acknowledges the role the media plays in 
furthering open justice, the principle that underlies the right to a trial in public, 
                                                          
40 H Wasserman & A de Beer ‘Which public? Whose interest? The South African Media and its role 
during the first ten years of democracy’ (2005) 19 Critical Arts: South-North Cultural and Media 
Studies 36 at 37. 
41 H Wasserman ‘Freedom's just another word? Perspectives on media freedom and responsibility in 
South Africa and Namibia’ (2010) 72 International Communication Gazette 567 at 569. 
42 Khumalo v Holomisa (2002) 5 SA 401 (CC).  
43 Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Limited (1996) 2 SA 588 (W).  
44 Holomisa supra 608-609.  
45 Chipu supra 28.  
46 Chipu supra quoting Khumalo supra.  
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which is part of the right to a fair trial. In the SABC case, the court stated that 
open justice 
‘promote[s] the accountability of courts and the administration of justice. It 
has traditionally been understood to mean that court hearings must be open to 
members of the public who wish to observe them and to journalists who wish 
to report upon them. Traditionally the principle has never been absolute’47. 
Stevenson argues that the media is a body upheld by the Constitution and should 
be endorsed and encouraged by society and government institutions.48 Given the 
political landscape of South Africa – a dominant one-party system with weak 
opposition and high risks of political corruption and subterfuge – an independent 
and enquiring media is a key agent for the maintenance of democracy.49 
Media freedom is a cause in which all citizens of a nation should be interested – 
not only are the media the gatekeepers of information that would otherwise prove 
difficult for a private citizen to obtain and disseminate, but they are the 
gatekeepers with a greater duty. They hold the keys to an informed citizenry and 
are the means by which the public can form opinions.  
Media freedom can thus be seen as a necessary prerequisite to the arguments 
made by Emerson, Dworkin and Stone in that the media, by exercising its right to 
free expression, is able to function as an instrument through which several other 
rights can be exercised by others.  
In the discussion of the need for free speech, Lichtenberg highlights a crucial 
reason for the protection of the right:  it ‘serves as the people's watchdog, 
ensuring independent criticism and evaluation of the established power of 
government and other institutions’.50  
Emerson, Stone, Dworkin, Wasserman, Lichtenberg and domestic jurisprudence 
have all shown that the media plays an integral role in providing for the 
realisation and exercise of other rights and principles. It is also clear that the 
purposes underlying the protection of the right to free expression are valuable 
and worth protecting.  
                                                          
47 South African Broadcasting Corp Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2007 
(1) SA 523 (CC) para 50.  
48 Stevenson op cit 618.  
49 Stevenson op cit 618. 
50 Lichtenberg op cit 337. 
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As important as media freedom is, there are downfalls. Lichtenberg echoes the 
argument made by Dworkin, that  
‘freedom of the press, in other words, is an instrumental good: it is good if it 
does certain things and not especially good (not good enough to justify 
special protections, anyway) otherwise’.51  
The right to free expression cannot operate without limit, nor can media freedom 
be left unchecked. This would lead to harm, and I agree with the views posited by 
Mill and Lichtenberg – where it leads to more harm than good, the right should 
be limited.  
I would argue, however, that the starting point of a matter should be the 
protection of the right to free expression and media freedom. First, considering 
the great value of the other rights which are dependent upon its exercise and the 
principles sought to be upheld through its exercise. Second, considering the wide 
audience which would be affected if media freedom is stifled. These factors tend 
toward a stance which prefers the protection of the right as a starting point. 
Where the exercise of the right must be limited, that is, where it causes or would 
cause more harm than good, these factors militate in favour of a form of 
limitation which would have the least inroad in the exercise of the right. 
(iii) The right to confidentiality  
Balanced against the right to free expression is the right of privacy. More 
specifically, the right of the asylum seeker to confidentiality in their applications 
for asylum. 
The right to confidentiality is one of the rights entailed by the right to privacy. 
The right to privacy is constitutionally entrenched by section 14 of the 
Constitution, which provides that ‘everyone has the right to privacy, which 
includes the right not to have…(d) the privacy of their communications 
infringed’. 
The right to privacy has been defined by the courts as ‘an individual condition of 
life characterised by exclusion from the public and publicity’.52 
                                                          
51 Ibid.  
52 National Media Ltd and others v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A). 
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The South Africa Law Commission also recognises that the protection of privacy  
‘generally limits the ability of people to gain, publish, disclose or use 
information about others without their consent. Individuals therefore have 
control not only over who communicates with them but also who has access 
to the flow of information about them.’53 
The right to privacy is a far broader right than will be broached in this thesis. The 
argument for the purposes of this thesis will remain within the confines of the 
right to confidentiality in the asylum context. 
a) Levels of protection 
Confidentiality is not provided for in international refugee law instruments. The 
main international refugee law instruments, the 1951 United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees54 and its 1967 Protocol55, do not discuss 
confidentiality.  
This is a matter for domestic law, as the circumstances that must be used to 
determine what procedural protections are to be afforded to asylum seekers and 
refugees are often unique to the circumstances and history of that country.56  
However, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) has 
provided an advisory opinion which includes a recommendation relating to the 
confidentiality of asylum proceedings. It provides that:  
‘the State that receives and assesses an asylum request must refrain from 
sharing any information with the authorities of the country of origin and 
indeed from informing the authorities in the country of origin that a national 
has presented an asylum claim’57.  
                                                          
53 South African Law Reform Commission ‘Privacy and Data Protection’ Discussion Paper 109 
(October 2005) at 61. Available at www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dp109.pdf. Accessed on 25 May 
2019. 
54 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 
1954). 
55 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 31 January 1967, entered into force 4 October 
1967). 
56 Southern African Litigation Centre, Heads of Argument in Chipu case (supra) as Amicus Curiae. 
Available at www.southafricanlitigationcenter.org/cases/completed-cases/south-africa-the-
confidentiality-provisions-in-the-south-african-refugees-act/.  Accessed on 14 April 2014. 
57 UNHCR Advisory Opinion on the Rules of Confidentiality Regarding Asylum Information. 
Available at www.refworld.org/pdfid42b9109e4.pdf Accessed on 14 April 2014. 
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The opinion is strongly in favour of the protection of information of the asylum 
seeker and their right to confidentiality.  It states that the vulnerable position of 
refugees and asylum seekers is of particular import given their situation. 
This theme of confidentiality in asylum proceedings is echoed in further UNHCR 
advisory opinions, including the UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: 
Gender-Related Persecution. This states that: 
‘[Claimants of refugee status] require a supportive environment where they 
can be reassured of the confidentiality of their claim. Some claimants, 
because of the shame they feel over what has happened to them, or due to 
trauma, may be reluctant to identify the true extent of the persecution suffered 
or feared. 
The claimant should be assured that his/her claim will be treated in the 
strictest confidence, and information provided by the claimant will not be 
provided to members of his/her family.’58 
Excerpts from the 2003 UNHCR Guidelines and the UNHCR Handbook also 
illustrate the need for the utmost respect of the asylum seeker’s confidentiality.  
These documents also provide that the examiner should create a climate of 
confidence for the asylum seeker to put forward his whole case. In the creation of 
this atmosphere, it is imperative that the applicant’s statements be kept 
confidential, and that he/she be informed of this right to confidentiality.59  
A later advisory opinion on confidentiality in asylum applications states that the 
right to privacy and its confidentiality requirements are ‘especially important for 
an asylum-seeker’.60 It warns against the sharing of personal information with the 
country of origin until the claim is rejected, as this would be ‘against the spirit of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention’. 
‘Likewise, the authorities of the country of asylum may not weigh the risks 
involved in sharing of confidential information with the country of origin, 
and conclude that it will not result in human rights violations’.61 
Regionally, there is no instrument which provides for the confidentiality of 
asylum applications. The 1969 Organisation of African Union Convention 
                                                          
58 UNHCR Advisory Opinion (7 May 2002) at paras 35-56.  
59 UNHCR Guidelines (2003) at para 33, UNHCR Handbook at para 200. 
60 UNHCR Advisory Opinion on the Rules of Confidentiality regarding Asylum Information (31 




Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa62 is silent on this 
issue. The sentiment of the UNHCR is, however, echoed in the regional 
European text providing for the confidentiality of the process: ‘European Council 
Directive on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting 
and Withdrawing Refugee Status’.63  
Although due recognition must be given to the views of the UNHCR, these do 
not in themselves determine how domestic legislation should be interpreted.64 
They are simply non-binding opinions, albeit issued by the highest body 
protecting refugees in international law. 
Nationally, section 21(5) of the South African Refugees Act65 provides for the 
right to confidentiality. It states that the confidentiality of asylum applications 
and the information contained therein must always be ensured.  
b) The purpose of the right 
The right to privacy is cast by Stone, quoting Wacks, as a ‘sweeping phrase 
which is as comprehensive as it is vague’.66  
In Chipu67, the Constitutional Court stated that the persecution faced by those 
who flee their countries is often perpetrated by the state, or not being halted by 
the state. The asylum seekers are often relentlessly pursued by the government, 
as are their friends and family at times.  
‘An asylum system which does not provide for any confidentiality 
whatsoever is highly unlikely to be effective. Many people who qualify as 
refugees would naturally be disinclined [against exposing] themselves to the 
serious risks inherent in such a system. The purpose of section 21(5) is vitally 
important.’68 
Justice Zondo, in his judgment, identifies three main reasons for the protection of 
the right:  
                                                          
62 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Adopted on 
10 September 1969 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, CAB/LEG/24.3., entered 
into force on 20 June 1974. 
63 European Council: Council of the European Union, Council Directive on Minimum Standards on 
Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status (2 January 2006) 
64 UNHCR opinion op cit. 
65 Refugees Act 130 of 1998. 
66 Stone op cit 433. 
67 Chipu supra.  
68 Chipu supra at paras 54, 55. 
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1. it protects the integrity of the asylum process; 
2. it encourages applicants for asylum to disclose information truthfully in the 
knowledge that only those officials dealing with asylum applications will 
have access to the applications and the information contained therein; and 
3. it protects asylum applicants and their families and friends in their countries 
of origin from possible dangers or threats to their lives and safety that could 
arise if the fact of the application for asylum and the information contained 
therein were disclosed.69 
Cohen discusses the Chipu case and identifies four reasons underlying the need 
to protect asylum seekers70:  
1. A blanket ban of access protects the integrity of the asylum system.71 
2. Disclosures may threaten the life, freedom and security of the asylum-
seeker.72 
3. Disclosure of applications endangers witnesses, relatives and associates of the 
asylum-seeker remaining in the country of origin.73 
4. Asylum proceedings are diplomatically sensitive, as the country of origin may 
attempt to exert its diplomatic power.74 
However, despite these reasons for confidentiality, Cohen makes the point that 
the press is a necessary requirement for the purposes of democracy. This is 
especially so, he argues, in a country where the right was severely curtailed by 
the apartheid government, and particularly in the field of refugee law, where the 
potential for fraud is a real concern.75 Cohen argues that the right to freedom of 
expression enhances the integrity of the asylum process by deterring fraud and 
                                                          
69 Chipu supra at para 54 
70 D Cohen, ‘Political refugee, diva or international kingpin? Evolving Confidentiality Requirements 
in Asylum Proceedings in South Africa and Beyond’ (2014) 2 Michigan State International Law 
Review Fourm Conveniens 1. 
71Cohen op cit 8. 
72 Ibid.  
73 Ibid.  
74 Ibid.  
75 Cohen op cit 9-10. 
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abuse through the promotion of accountability, transparency and fair 
proceeding.76 
While I agree that the purposes of protecting an asylum seeker’s right to 
confidentiality are valuable and worth protecting, the right cannot operate 
without limit. Where the exercise and protection of the right would lead to more 
harm than good, it should be limited. This is a general principle we can import 
from the writings of Mill and Lichtenberg – where the exercise of a right leads to 
more harm than good, it should be limited. The form of the limitation should 
create the least inroad into the right as possible.  
c) The potential for abuse by the press 
What Cohen fails to consider is the potential harm the press is capable of 
wreaking if allowed into the process, the possibility introduced by Lichtenberg.  
One angle, left unconsidered by the authors of the above texts, addresses the 
potential for the media to smear the name of the asylum seeker or to portray them 
in a bad light. This trial by media may even result in their application not being 
supported by the country where they seek asylum.  
Some academics have criticised the portrayal of refugees and asylum seekers by 
the media. They can enforce harmful stereotypes and fuel pervasive xenophobic 
attitudes. Especially in the South Africa, where xenophobia is rife77, the media 
may compound the problem by the manner in which they portray these 
individuals, if not done carefully and sensitively.   
In this vein, KhosraviNik conducted an analysis of the representation of refugees, 
asylum seekers and immigrants in British newspapers (the ‘RASIM group’).78  
The author found that texts discussing the RASIM group over the period of ten 
years by the media is largely negative. He looked at the connotations of the 
words ‘immigrant/immigrate versus emigrant/emigrate’. ‘Immigrant’ seems to 
                                                          
76 Ibid. 
77 C Abdi, ‘Xenophobia and its discontents in South Africa’, Aljazeera (18 June 2013). Available at 
www.aljazeera.com/stroy/201361895126526626. Accessed on 18 April 2014. 
78 M KhosraviNik, ‘The representation of refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants in British 
newspapers’ (2010) 9:1 Journal of Language and Politics 1. 
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‘carry a negative connotation and is generally the term used in negative discourse 
topics such as immigrants and crime’.79  
He further found that the processes of aggregation, collectivisation and 
functionalization were practiced.80 These are linguistic processes through which 
groups of people are systematically referred to and constructed as one unanimous 
group with all sharing similar characteristics. Using these techniques, the media 
have dehumanized and objectified the RASIM group.81  
Esses, Medianu and Lawson further discuss the role of the media in promoting 
the dehumanisation of refugees.82 They argue that the media play an important 
role in the dissemination and framing of policy relating to refugee issues, and 
construct and promote particular positions on these issues. Using data gathered 
from analyses of print media, the authors found that the portrayal of refugees in 
the West has become increasingly negative. The words associated with this group 
include ‘terrorists’, ‘criminals’ and ‘threats’.83  
Importantly, the authors note that ‘crises sell news, whereas positive stories are 
less newsworthy, so that…what may result is extreme negative reactions to 
immigrants and refugees, including their dehumanization.’84  
While I agree with the position that the press have an important purpose in being 
allowed entry and access into processes and proceedings which would otherwise 
be closed, they must take care not to abuse the power of their platform in the 
dissemination of this information. The consequences of biased and insensitive 
reporting would be aggravated in the asylum context, given the risks to the 
asylum seeker, his or her family and associates. 
The openness of the process between the media and the government may be the 
solution to this problem. The less uncertain the process, the less the media will 
problematize the situation, leading to less negative media portrayal of refugees.  
                                                          
79 KhovrasiNik op cit 11. 
80 KhovrasiNik op cit 13. 
81 KhovrasiNik op cit. 
82 Victoria M. Esses, Stelian Medianu and Andrea S. Lawson, ‘Uncertainty, Threat, and the Role of 
the Media in Promoting the Dehumanization of Immigrants and Refugees’ (2013) 69 Journal of 
Social Issues 518. 
83 Esses et al op cit 520. 
84 Esses et al op cit 522. 
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If the media and the RAA could be transparent on issues such as the way 
information regarding asylum seekers should be reported and how asylum 
seekers are represented in the media, it may mean that many of the problematic 
issues that have been identified could be avoided. It would require a balance of 
being instructive for the purposes of protecting the asylum seeker on the one 
hand versus not being too instructive to the point where the right to free 
expression of the media is stifled by the proscriptions of the RAA.  
(iv) Conclusion 
The right to free expression cannot operate without limit, nor can media freedom 
be left unchecked. This would lead to harm, and where it leads to more harm than 
good, the right should be limited.  
The starting point of a matter should be the protection of the right to free 
expression and media freedom. First, considering the great value of the other 
rights which are dependent upon its exercise and the principles sought to be 
upheld through its exercise. Second, considering the wide audience which would 
be affected if media freedom is stifled. These factors tend toward a stance which 
prefers the protection of the right as a starting point. Where the exercise of the 
right must be limited, that is, where it causes or would cause more harm than 
good, these factors ted toward a form of limitation which would have the least 
inroad in the exercise of the right. 
While the purposes of protecting an asylum seeker’s right to confidentiality are 
important, the right also cannot operate without limit. Where the exercise and 
protection of the right would lead to more harm than good, it should be limited.  
This is a general principle we should rely on – where the exercise of a right leads 
to more harm than good, it should be limited. However, the form of the limitation 
should create the least inroad into the right as possible. One such way to prevent 
against harm to asylum seekers is for the RAA to monitor and potentially amend 
media reports or coverage in such a way that it protects the asylum seeker and the 




III. The Chipu judicial process and public interest  
 
(i) Introduction 
While the previous chapter set out the jurisprudential underpinnings of the right 
to free expression and explained the broad purpose of the right, this chapter will 
examine the right more closely in the context of refugee law.  
The aim of this chapter is to record and analyse the sole primary sources on this 
issue which will serve as a summation of the domestic position on the issue, in 
contrast to the following chapter, which will discuss the foreign law position. 
The first part of this chapter will analyse the right to free expression and how it 
was framed by the High Court and the Constitutional Court in their respective 
Chipu judgments. Following the Chipu decision and the subsequent amendment 
to the Refugees Act, public interest is seemingly the only factor which must be 
proven by those seeking access to access RAA hearings. Thus, the next part of 
this chapter will examine two relevant public interest considerations: 
international criminal law and open justice.  
(ii) Chipu at the High Court  
The High Court85 held that while section 21 of the Refugees Act86 limits press 
freedom and the right to receive and impart ideas and information, as provided in 
section 16(1) of the Constitution, the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in 
light of section 36(1) of the Constitution.87 
Section 36(1) of the Constitution is dubbed the ‘limitations clause’, which 
provides for the factors which must be taken into account in the event that a right 
contained in the Bill of Rights88 is limited. It provides the following: 
‘The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including—  
(a) the nature of the right;  
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
                                                          
85 Mail and Guardian Media Limited and Others v Chipu N.O. and Others (case number 
226645/2011) (‘High Court Chipu’). 
86 Refugees Act 130 of 1998. 
87 High Court Chipu supra at para 29. 
88  That is, Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;  
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.’ 
The judgment made several significant findings. One finding is that section 21(5) 
of the Refugees Act is linguistically clear that the confidentiality of asylum 
applications and information contained therein must be ensured at all times, not 
simply in the initial stages.89 This is explained in light of the purpose of refugee 
law and the confidentiality obligations it imposes, which is ‘closely tied to the 
protection and promotion of the constitutional rights (inter alia) to human 
dignity, freedom and security of the person, privacy and just administrative 
action’.90  
In discussing the right to free expression, the Court traversed the applicants' 
arguments. These were, chiefly, that the right lies at the heart of democracy and 
the media is a key agent in ensuring that the right is enforced and respected; that 
the principle of ‘open justice’ applies, and that an active and informed citizenry 
requires access to information.91  Importantly, the Court noted that the right to 
free expression is neither paramount over other guaranteed rights, nor limitless.92  
The Court then moved onto a limitations analysis to determine whether the 
limitation contained in section 21(5) of the Refugees Act was a justifiable 
limitation of the right to free expression. 
In applying the factors set out in section 36(1), the Court discussed the nature of 
the right to free expression at length,93 then summarily skipped to instances 
where the right has been limited. 
It found that while the principles of open justice usually weigh in favour of 
opening proceedings, in this case there are countervailing interests which justify 
the limitation of the right to free expression.94  
                                                          
89 High Court Chipu supra at para 12. 
90 High Court Chipu supra at para 13. 
91 High Court Chipu supra at para 11. 
92 High Court Chipu supra at para 21. 
93 High Court Chipu supra at para 19. 
94 High Court Chipu supra at para 21. 
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In examining the purpose of the limitation, the Court found that a blanket ban on 
access is justified given the need to maintain the privacy and dignity of the 
asylum seeker and the integrity of the asylum-seeking process.95  
The Court further found that there is a relation between the limitation of the right 
to free expression and the purpose of that limitation, referring to the extensive 
discussion on the right to confidentiality in the asylum-seeking process.96  
Finally, the Court determined that the less restrictive means proposed to achieve 
the statute's purpose would not be suitable given the purpose of the right to 
confidentiality. The Court reasoned that asylum-seekers might be deterred from 
applying, and may not be candid, if they do not know whether their 
confidentiality will be respected under all circumstances.97  
In conclusion, the Court found that the limitation imposed by section 21(5) of the 
Refugees Act of the right to free expression is a justifiable limitation and not 
unconstitutional.98 
In my opinion, the judgment did not provide a detailed analysis of the importance 
of the right to free expression in the asylum context. The judgment appeared to 
be biased in favour of the right to confidentiality. The rights were unequally 
framed – the right to confidentiality and its underpinnings was discussed 
extensively. Other than the discussion in the limitations analysis, the right to 
confidentiality was not tested as being too extensively protected. Although this 
was tested in the limitations test, confidentiality appeared to be well buffered 
from attack as the Court seemed to overly rely on the importance of the right and 
failed to consider instances in which it could be justifiably limited.  
Further, the Court framed the right of free expression as one which cannot be 
paramount or limitless. It is interesting to note that limitation of rights was only 
mentioned in the context of the right to free expression, and not the right to 
confidentiality. It appeared that the right to free expression was limited to a far 
greater extent at the outset and theoretically than the right to confidentiality.  
                                                          
95 High Court Chipu supra at para 23. 
96 High Court Chipu supra at para 25. 
97 High Court Chipu supra at para 26. 
98 High Court Chipu supra at para 27. 
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There also appear to be gaps in the Court's reasoning regarding the balancing of 
the rights which are explained away by repeatedly affirming the importance of 
confidentiality in the asylum seeking process. The judgment failed to consider 
several arguments and compromises which would result in the least inroad into 
both rights. 
(iii) Chipu at the Constitutional Court  
The Court tested whether the limitation contained in section 21(5) of the 
Refugees Act is reasonable and justifiable by conducting a limitations analysis.  
The Court stated that free expression is important as it enables the public to form 
and express opinions on a wide range of matters and is thus vital to democracy.99 
The Court also recognised the role of the media as a facilitator, protector and 
guarantor of the right and reiterated that the media are ‘important agents in 
ensuring an open, responsive and accountable government’.100  
The discussion on the importance of the purpose of the limitation focussed on 
confidentiality being vital to the asylum application process, as it protects the 
asylum seeker's friends and family. Further, the Court acknowledged that an 
asylum system which does not provide for confidentiality would be ineffective 
and would likely be a system which to refugees would be unwilling to submit.101  
The Court found that there was a relation between the limitation and its purpose – 
the limitation protects asylum seekers and the integrity of the asylum 
system.102As to whether there were less restrictive means to achieve the purpose, 
the Constitutional Court referenced a situation where the asylum seeker's 
information was already in the public domain.103 It was held that in such a 
situation, the limitation serves no purpose and cannot be justified.104  
The Court also referred to the example of an asylum seeker who is rejected on the 
basis of the commission of a crime against humanity. In such a case, there is no 
                                                          
99 Constitutional Court Chipu supra at paras 50 and 51. 
100 Constitutional Court Chipu supra at para 52. 
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reason why the confidentiality provisions of the Refugees Act should protect 
such an application, as the limitation would not serve any purpose.105  
In this vein, the Court noted an inconsistency in the application of the 
confidentiality provisions – a person who has committed a crime against 
humanity or a crime against the peace is disqualified from getting refugee status, 
but section 21(5) of the Refugees Act would still prohibit access to their 
application.106  
The Court found that the purpose of section 21(5) of the Refugees Act can be 
achieved by less restrictive means – conferring a right on the RAB to exercise 
discretion in appropriate conditions.107 If the RAB is granted a discretion, it 
should consider a number of factors when granting access. These include whether 
granting access would be in the public interest.108  
In conclusion, the Court held that section 21(5) of the Refugees Act is not a 
reasonable and justifiable limitation of the right to free expression insofar as it 
does not allow the RAB to exercise discretion.109 
In my view, the Constitutional Court's judgment also leaves a gap. The Court 
discussed two factors the RAB (now the RAA) can take into consideration when 
deciding whether to exercise its discretion. One factor whether granting access 
would be in the public interest.110 The Court does not delve into what these 
public interest considerations would be in this instance. Domestically, there is 
judicial precedent as to what constitutes ‘public interest’ generally.111 While 
these established sources of what constitutes public interest may be useful, it is 
argued that public interest considerations in the asylum context would need to be 
nuanced and specific.  
For this reason, the second part of this chapter will examine two public interest 
considerations which are more tailored to the asylum context to understand what 
would underpin an application for access to an RAA hearing. 
                                                          
105 Constitutional Court Chipu supra at para 61. 
106 Constitutional Court Chipu supra at para 57. 
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(iv) Public interest considerations 
a) Public interest generally 
As a starting point, I briefly set out the general principles of public interest.  
Swanepoel draws on the South African Law Commission’s 1998 proposals on the 
issue.112 He cites the Al-Bashir113 case as invoking the principles of public 
interest. The nature of the case is relevant for the context of my argument on 
international criminal law. With approval, he quotes the applicant’s argument: 
‘It is also important to all South Africans that their government be compelled 
to abide by the law, both international and domestic. The rule of law is a 
founding value of South Africa and is enshrined in the Constitution. 
When officials of the South African government fail to fulfil their legal 
obligations, particularly in such a serious and public matter as the instant 
case, it affects all South Africans equally, as it demonstrates an unjustifiable 
disregard for the law and an unjustifiable tolerance of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.’114 
Swanepoel also cites Southern African Litigation Centre v National Director of 
Public Prosecutions115, which centred on international criminal law and South 
Africa’s responsibilities. The applicants successfully argued that  
‘the international community universally condemns torture, and they have 
“an interest in the prohibition of torture and the apprehension of torturers”. 
The essential content of the public interest involved in the application was 
that, without effective prosecution of torturers, there was a risk of “South 
Africa becoming a safe haven for torturers, who may travel here freely with 
impunity”’.116 
Swanepoel notes that the Commission posited that two different meanings that 
can be attached to ‘public interest’:117  
‘The phrase can firstly mean that it is in the public interest to have a 
particular matter raised and adjudicated. Secondly, it can mean that the effect 
of the successful outcome of the matter is that each and every member of the 
public or part thereof benefits therefrom.’118 
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Another important judgment as to what constitutes public interest is the minority 
judgment of O’Regan J in Ferreira v Levin119. The judgment sets out a list of 
factors to determine whether an applicant is acting in the public interest. They 
include: 
‘whether there is another reasonable and effective manner in which the 
challenge can be brought; the nature of the relief sought, and the extent to 
which it is of general and prospective application; and the range of persons or 
groups who may be directly or indirectly affected by any order made by the 
court’. 120 
The Al-Bashir and Southern African Litigation Centre matters illustrate that 
South Africa takes its international and domestic obligations seriously, 
particularly those which implicate international criminal law. They also illustrate 
the importance of holding institutions and officials responsible in the discharge of 
their duties and the associated public interest in achieving that end.  
In addition to the substance of the matter being in the public interest, literature121 
and case law122 suggest that certain procedural or definitional requirements must 
be met in order for a matter to be deemed to be ‘in the public interest’.  
These ‘definitional requirements’ include that a matter will be in the public 
interest if the effect of the successful outcome of the matter is that the public or 
part thereof benefits therefrom.123 This harks back to the argument posited in 
Chapter 2 – the greater the scope of exercise of the right to free expression, the 
greater it should be protected.124  
This argument is supported by the public interest principle – a matter is in the 
public interest where it is likely to benefit many, or most. Thus, where the right 
to free expression is being used to benefit the public at large, this should fall into 
the definition of being in the public interest. 
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The minority judgment of Ferreira v Levin125 provides considerations which 
could guide media organisations in their applications for access to the RAA. 
They form a clear basis of grounds to consider in an application. 
b) Public interest in the asylum context 
There are two factors in particular which should inform whether there is public 
interest in a specific matter before the RAA. These factors are: international 
criminal law and transparency of RAA processes, and the concepts of ‘open 
justice’ and democracy. Where any one of these factors, or a combination of 
these factors, are applicable to a certain matter before the RAA, the media’s 
argument for access will be stronger. 
The two abovementioned factors are by no means an exhaustive list, nor do they 
form a definitive list as to what should be taken into account by the RAA. Rather, 
they are suggested factors, especially pertinent to the Chipu case, and which have 
been identified by the parties and by the Constitutional Court in its decision. 
(i) International Criminal Law 
Domestically, South Africa acknowledged its obligations under international law 
to apprehend and punish those who commit international crimes in the case of S v 
Basson126 and through the adoption of national legislation.  
South Africa is a party to the Geneva Conventions and its protocols127 and has 
enacted the Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act,128 incorporating 
these provisions into South Africa’s domestic legal order. The Geneva 
Conventions require South Africa to ‘search for, punish and prosecute 
perpetrators’.129  
South Africa is also a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court130 and adopted the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International 
                                                          
125 Ferreira v Levin supra. 
126 S v Basson 2005 (1) SA 171 (CC) at para 37.  
127 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War; the 1977 Additional Protocol to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts; and the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts. 
128 Act 8 of 2012.  
129 SALC Heads of Argument op cit 7.  
130 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 
July 1998.  
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Criminal Court Act131 to carry out its obligations in accordance with the principle 
of complementarity,132 to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible 
for international crimes.133 
The Southern African Litigation Centre (‘SALC’), admitted by the Constitutional 
Court as an amicus curiae in the Chipu case, argued for the importance of free 
expression for the purpose of upholding international criminal law obligations. 
Their argument was based on section 4(1)(a) of the Refugees Act. This section 
provides that: 
‘a person does not qualify for refugee status for the purposes of this Act if 
there is reason to believe that he or she has committed a crime against peace, 
a war crime or a crime against humanity, as defined in any international legal 
instrument dealing with any such crimes.’134 
The section is an exclusion to asylum for those seeking refuge in South Africa. 
This provision is not unique to our domestic system135 – it is also a feature in 
international instruments dealing with refugees.136 It prohibits states from 
granting refugee status to persons accused of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide.137 Even though they may meet the definitional criteria 
for refugeehood, where there is reason to believe that the individual has 
committed an international crime, they may be excluded from protection.138  
                                                          
131 Act 27 of 2002.  
132 This principle specific to international criminal law allows for the initiation of domestic 
prosecutions of international crimes in accordance with duly adopted national legislation 
incorporating provisions of the Rome Statute. Arts 1 and 17 of the Rome Statute op cit.  
133 Preamble of the Rome Statute op cit.  
134 Ibid.  
135 SALC Founding Affidavit op cit 12.  
136 The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1969 OAU Convention op cit both recognise classes of 
persons who are not eligible for refugee status even if they satisfy the inclusionary criteria. 
 
Article 1(F)(a) of the Refugees Convention provides that: 
‘The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are 
serious reasons for considering that: 
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined 
in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes.’ 
 
Article 1 (5) of the OAU Convention provides that: 
‘The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom the country of 
asylum has serious reasons for considering that:  
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in 
the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes’. 
137 SALC Founding Affidavit op cit 13.  
138 SALC Heads of Argument op cit 10. 
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The purpose of the exclusion is to ensure the integrity and sustainability of the 
asylum-seeking process, so that only those who are genuinely in need of 
protection are granted it.139 ‘In the premises, the purpose of section 4(1)(b) of the 
Act is not only rational and reasonable in the circumstances, it also conforms to 
the relevant laws, norms and standards of international law.’140 
The purpose of the exclusion clause is therefore two-fold:  
1. It protects refugee status from being abused by those who are 
undeserving; and 
2. It ensures that those who have committed grave crimes do not escape 
prosecution.141 
These sentiments are echoed in judgments of foreign courts. The Canadian 
Supreme Court held in Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration)142 that  
‘[w]hen the tables are turned on persecutors, who suddenly become the 
persecuted, they cannot claim refugee status. International criminals, on all 
sides of the conflicts, are rightly unable to claim refugee status.’ 
‘The rationale is that those who are responsible for the persecution which 
creates refugees should not enjoy the benefits of a Convention designed to 
protect those refugees.’143 
I agree that asylum applicants who have committed, or who are believed to have 
committed, such atrocities rightly should not qualify for the protection offered by 
the asylum system by operation of section 4 of the Refugees Act.  
However, I also agree with the approach in Gavrić,144 which holds that 
‘exclusion decisions are…subject to the internal remedies of the Act and an 
applicant may appeal’. This echoes the position of the Guidelines on 
                                                          
139 SALC Heads of Argument op cit 11. 
140 Gavrić v Refugee Status Determination Officer, Cape Town and Others [2018] ZACC 38 at para 
25. 
141 See Guidelines on International Protection No. 5: Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F 
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 4 September 2003 at para 2.  
See also Khan and Schreier, Refugee Law in South Africa (2014) at 93; Gilbert “Current Issues in the 
Application of the Exclusion Clauses” in Feller, Türk and Nicholson (eds.) Refugee Protection in 
International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (2003) at 427-8. 
142 Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, Canada: 
Supreme Court, 4 June 1998 (‘Pushpanthan’), at para 63, citing Sivakuma v Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration) (CA) [1993] 1 CF 433, Canada: Federal Court at 445.  
143 Pushpanthan supra 63.  
144 Gavrić supra at para 53. 
37 
 
International Protection No. 5, which states that ‘given the grave consequences of 
exclusion, it is essential that rigorous procedural safeguards are built into the 
exclusion determination procedure’.145  
International criminal law considerations are in the public interest for three 
reasons. First, it is based on the general principle that the public should be 
informed and aware of news and events which affect them and the country. 
Second, it is based on the general requirement of openness, transparency and 
accountability of institutions exercising public power. Third, it is based on the 
specific need for public and judicial scrutiny of asylum processes.  
First, the public should know the nature and conduct of certain asylum seekers 
entering its territory as a matter of national security. The public have an interest 
in being appraised of events and other news which may affect their safety and 
security.146 An asylum seeker who has committed, or is believed to have 
committed, grave crimes could pose a threat to national security and may be a 
threat to public safety. The public should be appraised of information of this 
nature. 
Second, the public has the right to demand transparency from those organs of 
state tasked with enforcing and upholding South Africa’s obligations.147 The 
RAA is one such body which exercises public power. The general value of 
openness and transparency for the public in the decisions of quasi-judicial bodies 
is discussed in point (iv) below. The specific need for transparency of RAA 
processes is that the public should be aware of the decisions of bodies which are 
tasked with upholding the country’s international human rights obligations.148 It 
is only through access to RAA hearings and obtaining reports on RAA processes 
and decisions that this can be achieved. It is important that the public be allowed 
to monitor the compliance of bodies tasked with upholding constitutional and 
legislative obligations.149 
                                                          
145 Guidelines on International Protection No. 5 op cit at para 31. 
146 Holomisa supra at para 615, where Cameron J states that ‘[t]he success of our constitutional 
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147 Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission [2018] ZACC 8 at para 67. 




Third, the public and the courts should be able to scrutinise the decisions of and 
hold the relevant bodies accountable should they not exercise their powers 
correctly.150 It is important for the efficient and proper operation of an institution 
that there is oversight and scrutiny. This is even more important in the case of 
public institutions which exercise judicial powers.151 These organisations should 
be held to a higher standard as they are imbued with wide powers and exercise 
them on behalf of the country.152 The only means through which the public and 
courts can monitor, scrutinise and challenge the decisions of these institutions is 
through being granted access to them.  
It is important to maintain the integrity of the asylum system and protect it from 
abuse,153 and allowing access into that process can aid this. If the media can 
access asylum appeal proceedings, it could lead to early detection and prevention 
of entry of human rights abusers. Early intervention, at the stage when the RAA 
is still to decide the outcome of the asylum application, may mean that the media 
could access information about the asylum seeker and their potential involvement 
in the commission of international crimes. As SALC argued, confidentiality 
inherently limits the likelihood of early detection and prevention of entry of those 
responsible for section 4(1)(a) crimes.154 
If the asylum application process is kept secret, and if the processes and decisions 
of the RAA are not monitored and scrutinised, there is scope for degradation of 
the asylum and criminal systems through corruption and maladministration. 
Review and transparency mechanisms are designed to be protectors against such 
risks, and function to minimise the threat of such instances. To achieve this, 
access should be granted to RAA hearings and reports obtained on its decisions. 
These are matters in which there is public interest. 
(ii) ‘Open Justice’ and Participatory Democracy 
While the Constitutional Court Chipu judgment did not deal extensively with this 
argument, it noted the purpose of the principle of open justice.155  
                                                          
150 Ibid. 
151 SABC supra at para 32. 
152 Gavrić supra at para 67. 
153 Gavrić supra at paras 23 and 24. 
154 SALC Heads of Argument op cit at para 34. 
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In discussing the principle, the Court cited South African Broadcasting Corp Ltd 
v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others (‘SABC’).156 SABC stated 
that open justice is a principle which underlies the right to a trial in public, which 
is part of the right to a fair trial.157 It is a principle which  
‘promotes the accountability of courts and the administration of justice. It has 
traditionally been understood to mean that court hearings must be open to 
members of the public who wish to observe them and to journalists who wish 
to report upon them’.158 
The High Court Chipu judgment159 noted the judgment of S v Mamabolo160, and 
a decision of the House of Lords in Scott v Scott161. Both those judgments note 
the same point: publicity and transparency are guards against improbity and 
ensure free and frank debate, promoting impartiality.162 
A number of other Constitutional Court cases underline the importance of the 
principles of open justice and accountability.163 The general principle of open 
justice was discussed in Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a 
Metrorail164 and President of the Republic of SA v M & G Media165. Both 
judgments highlight the importance of accountability. 
Although it is essential as a founding value,166 it is also a guard against a 
government operating in secrecy.167 The principle of open justice further 
‘ensure[s] transparency, accountability and responsiveness in the way courts and 
all organs of State function’.168 
                                                          
156 South African Broadcasting Corp Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 
[2006] ZACC 15; 2007 (1) SA 523 (CC) ('SABC'), quoted at para 53 of the Constitutional Court 
Chipu. 
157 SABC supra at para 50, quoted at para 53 of Chipu supra. 
158 Ibid. 
159 High Court Chipu at para 11. 
160 S v Mamabolo (E-TV and Others Intervening) 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC). 
161 Scott v Scott [1913] (AC) 417. 
162 High Court Chipu at para 11, quoting Mamabolo supra at paras 28-29 and Scott supra at 447. 
163 Applicant's heads of argument at para 14. 
164 Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC) ('Rail 
Commuters Action Group'). 
165 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v M & G Media Ltd 2012 (2) SA 50 (CC). 
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167 President of the Republic of South Africa supra at para 10. 
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Open justice is not only intrinsically important, but also instrumentally important. 
In S v Mamabolo, the Constitutional Court stated that: 
'openness seeks to ensure that the citizenry know what is happening, such 
knowledge in turn being a means towards the next objective: so that the 
people can discuss, endorse, criticise, applaud or castigate the conduct of 
their courts. And, ultimately, such free and frank debate about judicial 
proceedings serves more than one vital public purpose. 
Ideally, also, robust and informed public debate about judicial affairs 
promotes peace and stability by convincing [the public] … that there exists a 
set of just norms and a trustworthy mechanism for their enforcement.'169 
SABC makes the point that open justice is important not only for the media, but 
also for the wider public: 
'This case, then, is not essentially about the rights of the SABC. Rather, it 
concerns the right of South Africans to know and understand the manner in 
which one of the three arms of government functions, namely, the Judiciary. 
This is a strong constitutional consideration… the fact that courts do their 
work in the public eye is a key mechanism for ensuring their 
accountability.'170 
The applicants make the point that the public have access to judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings in order to preserve accountability, integrity, impartiality, 
and fairness.171 The RAA is a quasi-judicial body which exercises final authority 
in asylum applications.172 It is important that light is brought to bear on the RAA 
in order to test its impartiality, integrity and accountability.  
Open justice is a check on the RAA, which would hold it to account. In this 
instance, the principle operates as an intrinsic right. Access to RAA hearings 
would invite public scrutiny of its decisions and thereby hold it accountable.  
Open justice is also an instrumental principle which is tied to transparency, 
fairness and democracy. These are principles which rely on the proper exercise of 
the others to be fully effective. Further, open justice engenders public debate and 
allows the public to be informed. In these ways, open justice is instrumental to 
the exercise of other rights. 
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Applications for access to RAA hearings would be bolstered by an argument for 
open justice. It is a principle which speaks to public interest – not only is it 
intrinsically important, but it is also instrumentally important as a key to the 
exercise of other rights and principles. 
(v) Recommendations for access to RAA hearings 
It is clear from the amended Refugees Act that the RAA’s decision to allow 
access to its hearings is limited to two bases. The first is that access will be 
granted where the asylum seeker gives consent. The second is where it is in the 
public interest to allow access.  
The RAA would have to consider on a balance of probabilities whether the public 
interest in the matter would outweigh the interests of maintaining confidentiality. 
Instead of simply proving ‘negatively’ that no harm exists, an applicant seeking 
access should rather prove ‘positively’ that public interest exists.  
The media may be required to commit to more sensitive reporting as it may be 
called to maintain the protection offered to asylum seekers by abiding by the 
RAA’s access conditions should it choose to impose any. Although this would 
suggest an inroad into the pure application of the right to free expression, it does 
not follow that this inroad is untenable and unjustifiable.  
The RAA should equally hold itself to a high ethical standard in this regard and 
should seek only to safeguard the interests of the asylum seeker, not its own 
interests in maintaining confidentiality of its processes as an institution.  
The RAA would have to walk a fine line when placing conditions on access – the 
more restrictive a requirement, the greater the inroad it would have on the right to 
free expression. However, where a restriction is insufficient, the risk of a breach 
of an asylum seeker’s right to confidentiality is greater.  
(vi) Conclusion 
The RAA is granted a weighty power, which brings with it a weighty duty. The 
RAA is required to balance the rights of free expression and confidentiality, to 
decide whether access to its hearings should be granted and access conditions. In 
the event that the asylum seeker does not give consent to the access, the RAA 
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will be required to consider whether access is in the public interest, the grounds 
of such interest, and weigh countervailing confidentiality considerations.  
While the High Court and Constitutional Court provided a sound basis for these 
issues, it is clear that neither judgment considered the matter to its full extent. 
The Courts had only one crisp issue before them – is the limitation of the right to 
free expression justified? The courts have answered this and in so doing, 
provided the only domestic jurisprudence on this issue.  
The next chapter will explore the powers of bodies similar to the RAA in foreign 
jurisdictions – New Zealand and Canada. The aim is to provide a comparison of 
similar powers provided to similar bodies and how these powers were exercised 




IV. Foreign law analysis 
 
(i) Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding of how the right to 
free expression in the context of refugee law is dealt with in foreign jurisdictions. 
The aim of this is to provide guidance to the RAA, the courts, and those 
interpreting and/or relying on the amended section 21(5)173.  
This chapter will focus on the judgments of the courts and “RAA-equivalent” 
bodies in each jurisdiction to determine how the rights have been balanced and 
protected, the arguments used to protect each right, and the success of the 
argument. The discussion on each jurisdiction will conclude with key takeaway 
points that we can potentially adopt or consider adopting in interpreting and 
applying section 21(5) of the Refugees Act. 
I have chosen New Zealand and Canada as comparative jurisdictions because 
they have both been identified as countries with liberal and open asylum 
policies.174 Their refugee policies are comprehensive and well-developed. 
Canada has welcomed high numbers of refugees, including 25 000 Syrian 
refugees in during 2015 and 2016.175 The Canadian Prime Minister, Justin 
Trudeau, has also ‘underscored his government's commitment to bringing in 
“those fleeing persecution, terror & war”’.176 
New Zealand has a ‘world leading asylum determination system and refugee 
resettlement programme. The Government, Non-Government Organisations and 
communities provide a wide range of support to asylum claimants and people 
from refugee backgrounds.’177 Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and her 
government have also ‘adopted a community sponsorship model for refugees that 
                                                          
173 South African Refugees Act, Act 130 of 1998. 
174 E Smick ‘Canada’s Immigration Policy’ Council on Foreign Relations, 6 July 2006. Available at 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/canadas-immigration-policy. Accessed on 30 May 2019.  
175 H Spectator ‘Editorial: Protecting the integrity of Canada’s refugee system’ The Spectator, 11 
April 2019. Available at https://www.thespec.com/opinion-story/9280172-editorial-protecting-the-
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176 ‘US refugee ban: Canada's Justin Trudeau takes a stand’ BBC News, 29 January 2017. Available at 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38786656. Accessed on 30 May 2019. 
177 ‘Discussion Paper: Treating asylum claimants with dignity and respect’ NZ Human Rights 
Commission, June 2017. Available at 
https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/7515/0223/2928/ESC_Rights_Discussion_2017_ONLINE.pdf. Accessed 
on 30 May 2019.  
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has been specifically mentioned by the United Nations as it drafts its latest 
refugee strategy’.178 
(ii) New Zealand 
New Zealand has an extensive and thorough refugee law system. The governing 
legislation, the Immigration Act 51 of 2009 (‘Immigration Act’), provides for 
how claims for asylum are made179, who may make a claim,180 the procedure for 
claims181, and the cessation or cancellation of recognition of refugee status182. The 
Immigration Act also establishes the Immigration and Protection Tribunal.183 The 
Tribunal decides appeals against decisions relating to refugeehood made in terms 
of the Immigration Act.184 
a) Governing legislation 
The Immigration Act185 is the principal legislation which governs asylum and 
refugee-related matters in New Zealand, and in particular, section 151 of that Act 
governs confidentiality. 
The Immigration Act prescribes that confidentiality as to the identity of the 
claimant and the particulars of a claim must be maintained during and subsequent 
to the determination of a claim.186 This mirrors the South African Refugees Act, 
which also requires that confidentiality must be maintained at all times as the 
default position (with the exceptions to the default position, as set out in section 
21(5) of the Refugees Act187, as previously discussed.188) 
However, the similarities between refugee legislation regarding confidentiality in 
South Africa and New Zealand ends there. The New Zealand Immigration Act 
seemingly goes further than the South African Refugees Act in its protection of 
the confidentiality of the claimant and the refugee system. From a reading of the 
                                                          
178 L Walters ‘NZ works to double refugee quota as others close their borders’ Stuff, 20 June 2018. 
Available at https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/104837520/nz-works-to-double-refugee-quota-
as-others-close-their-borders. Accessed on 30 May 2019. 
179 Section 133 of the New Zealand Immigration Act, Act 51 of 2009. 
180 Section 129 of the New Zealand Immigration Act, Act 51 of 2009. 
181 Section 133 -142 of the New Zealand Immigration Act, Act 51 of 2009. 
182 Section 143 – 148 of the New Zealand Immigration Act, Act 51 of 2009. 
183 Section 217 of the New Zealand Immigration Act, Act 51 of 2009. 
184 Section 217(2) of the New Zealand Immigration Act, Act 51 of 2009. 
185 New Zealand Immigration Act, Act 51 of 2009. 
186 Section 151(1) of the New Zealand Immigration Act, Act 51 of 2009. 
187 South African Refugees Act, Act 130 of 1998. 
188 See the discussion under point (v) of Chapter 3. 
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Immigration Act, it appears that the New Zealand position differs from the South 
African position in three ways.  
First, the exceptions to the default position are more limited. Secondly, the appeal 
body is not empowered to exercise any discretion to allow public access to its 
hearings. Thirdly, the legislation only allows for a countervailing public interest 
consideration to be taken into account in one limited instance. 
The default position in New Zealand is subject to certain exceptions, set out in 
section 151(2) of the Immigration Act. These exceptions provide that confidential 
information regarding a claim may be disclosed for the purposes of determining 
the claim,189 and to the UNHCR,190 among others.  
Two exceptions in the Immigration Act, which mirror the South African 
considerations of safety of the claimant and of their family and associates,191 are 
contained in section 151(2)(d) and section 151(2)(e) of the Immigration Act. The 
former allows for information relating to a claim to be published in a decision by 
the Immigration and Protection Tribunal or otherwise in a manner which would 
be ‘unlikely to allow identification of the person concerned’.192 The latter allows 
for the disclosure of information if there is ‘no serious possibility that the safety 
of the claimant or any other person would be endangered by the disclosure of the 
information’.193 
A further exception to the default position which mirrors the South African 
position194 is contained in section 151(6) of the Immigration Act, which provides 
that a claimant can waive his or her right to confidentiality either expressly or 
impliedly.  
The Immigration and Protection Tribunal is a creature of statute, like the RAA, 
and can only exercise the powers granted to it by the Immigration Act. The 
Tribunal is established in section 3(2)(f) and 217 of the Immigration Act, and its 
regulating provisions are contained in Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act.  
                                                          
189 Section 151(2)(a) of the New Zealand Immigration Act, Act 51 of 2009. 
190 Section 151(2)(c) of the New Zealand Immigration Act, Act 51 of 2009. 
191 Section 21(5)(b)(vi) of the South African Refugees Act, Act 130 of 1998. 
192 Section 151(2)(d) of the New Zealand Immigration Act, Act 51 of 2009. 
193 Section 151(2)(e) of the New Zealand Immigration Act, Act 51 of 2009. 
194 Section 21(5)(a) of the South African Refugees Act, Act 130 of 1998. 
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In terms of section 18(3) of Schedule 2, ‘if an appeal is brought by a claimant, a 
refugee or a protected person, or a person formerly recognised as a refugee or a 
protected person, the Tribunal must conduct the hearing in private’. This is an 
emphatic blanket ban on public access to appeals before the Tribunal. This is not 
in line with the current South African position, which allows the RAA to exercise 
a discretion to allow access to its hearings.195 The Tribunal is granted the further 
power to make an order prohibiting the publication of any information it receives, 
or its proceedings.196  
Importantly, the Tribunal must publish its decisions for research purposes,197 but 
it can edit the decision in such a way to remove the name of the persons involved 
and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant or other 
person before publicly disseminating the decision.198  
Unlike South Africa, which allows public interest to be taken into consideration 
when determining whether to grant access to RAA hearings,199 the Immigration 
Act provides that publication of the Tribunal’s decisions relating to a claim 
(other than for research purposes)200 may be allowed where it is in the public 
interest to do so.201 If it is found that there is no serious possibility that the safety 
of the claimant or any other person would be endangered by the disclosure of the 
information,202 ‘the Attorney-General may, subject to any orders of the Tribunal, 
publish the decision of the Tribunal relating to the claim if the Attorney-General 
determines that, in the circumstances of the particular case, it is in the public 
interest to do so’.203 
While it appears that New Zealand refugee legislation is more limiting of the 
right to free expression and more protective of the right to confidentiality, case 
law suggests that the right to free expression is well-protected. 
                                                          
195 Section 21(5) of the South African Refugees Act, Act 130 of 1998. 
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b) Case law 
Refugee Appeal No. 76299 and Refugee Appeal No. 76297 – the importance of 
accountability, equality and fairness as principles underlying access 
In the matter of Refugee Appeal No. 76299 and Refugee Appeal No. 76297,204 the 
Refugee Status Appeals Authority (the predecessor of the Immigration and 
Protection Tribunal) decided a matter which dealt with the publication of a 
decision of the Authority. Counsel for the appellants requested that the ‘TD 
decision’205 be made available to them, as their clients’ cases appeared to be 
similar.206  
Three underlying reasons for publication of the TD decision were argued:207 
accountability,208 equal treatment209 and fairness.210 Further, it was argued that the 
Authority had a duty to facilitate access to its decisions as it is the ultimate 
decision-maker in these instances.211  
The Authority stated that generally, refugee claims should be kept confidential.212 
The Immigration Act provided for the exceptions to the confidentiality obligation 
including waiver and the absence of a serious possibility of endangerment.213  
The Authority concluded that the exceptions to the confidentiality obligation 
applied to the TD decision, as TD had waived his right to confidentiality and 
there was no serious possibility of endangerment.214 Thus, the Authority ordered 
the publication of the TD decision, providing that his name be redacted from the 
decision.215 
                                                          
204 Refugee Appeal Nos. 76299 & 76297, Nos. 76299 & 76297, New Zealand: Refugee Status Appeals 
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48 
 
Attorney-General v X and Another – the importance of international criminal law 
as a motivating factor for disclosure/access  
In Attorney-General v X and Another,216 the New Zealand Supreme Court 
decided on the interpretation of the former confidentiality provision of the 
Immigration Act, section 129T,217 and whether section it allowed for disclosure in 
order to investigate X’s extradition or prosecution.218  
The Court acknowledged that section 129T(3)(b) imposed two conditions for 
disclosure. First, that the disclosure is to ‘an officer or employee of a 
Government department or other Crown agency’, and second, that the ‘functions 
of that officer or employee must “require” disclosure’.219  
In the result, the Court held that section 129T, properly construed, permits the 
disclosure of information relating to X’s claim to officials who require that 
information to determine X’s extradition or prosecution.220  
Underlying this disclosure is Article 1F of the Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees221, which provides that the Convention does not protect those who 
have committed a war crimes.222  To give effect to this principle, and the 
principle of aut dedere aut judicare,223 it was held that section 129T(3)(b) should 
allow disclosure to those officials considering extradition or prosecution.224 
K v Attorney-General (High Court) – the importance of disclosure in furthering 
the principles of open justice and accountability 
In the case of K v Attorney-General,225 the High Court of New Zealand dealt with 
the scope of the confidentiality obligation of section 151 of the Immigration Act. 
K sought to overturn a decision of a Refugee Protection Officer (‘RPO’) who 
refused to keep information relating to K’s witnesses confidential.226  
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K requested that the RPO limit the disclosure of the information in his witness 
statements to a specified list of people.227 Further, K requested an undertaking 
that information regarding his witnesses would not be disclosed to any other 
person without notice to K’s counsel as to why the disclosure is necessary and 
not a threat to the safety of the witness.228  
The RPO’s argued that the only limitations by which he was bound were those in 
section 151 of the Immigration Act, and he did not consider that he had the 
power to limit disclosure to other officials.229  
K’s counsel relied on an UNHCR advisory opinion which230 reiterates the need 
for protection of asylum seekers’ privacy and confidentiality,231 and that the State 
receiving such information should refrain from sharing that information with the 
asylum seeker’s country of origin.232  
The Court noted that the UNHCR advisory opinion did not contemplate that the 
confidentiality obligation would be absolute.233 Further, the Court noted the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v X,234 which permitted the 
disclosure of information contained in a claim to officials who required that 
information for the claimant’s possible extradition.235  
The Court found that the requirements of natural justice should ‘enable the RSB 
to investigate the truthfulness of statements which it has been asked to take into 
account in making the determination required’.236 
Regarding the RPO’s contention that he was not empowered to limit the extent to 
which information he received would be available to other government 
officials,237 the Court held that section 151 is permissive, and would not prevent 
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the RPO from giving an undertaking or another means of limiting the exercise of 
its powers to disclose information to others.238 
The Court held that the RSB (and the RPO) had shown itself to be mindful of its 
confidentiality obligations239 and was not unreasonable240 in not entering into an 
arrangement which would have prevented it from making permitted disclosures 
in terms of section 151.241  
In the result, the Court held that K was not entitled to the relief sought, given the 
interpretation of the RPO and the RSB of their obligations in terms of section 
151(2) of the Immigration Act.242 
K v Attorney-General (Court of Appeal) – the importance of taking reasonable 
measures to protect asylum seekers 
The K v Attorney-General (High Court) case discussed above went on appeal to 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal.243  
The issues before the Court of Appeal were largely those before the High 
Court,244 including whether the RSB’s refusal to give the confidentiality 
undertakings breached K’s right of natural justice;245 and whether the RSB’s 
refusal to give the confidentiality undertakings was unreasonable.246  
As to whether an RPO can limit the disclosure of information under section 
151(2) to protect witnesses, the Court held that confidentiality undertakings 
which restrict the disclosure of information are not precluded.247 The Court points 
out that the RPO should ‘be willing to consider reasonable measures that reduce 
the risk that disclosure will identify the person or place the safety of anyone at 
risk’.248 Whilst the Court found that the RSB may give undertakings, these cannot 
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include irrevocable undertakings which may have the effect of tying the court’s 
hands.249 
On whether the RSB’s refusal to provide the undertakings breached K’s right to 
natural justice, the Court acknowledged that an RPO is a public authority 
empowered to make decisions which implicates rights in the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 and as such, natural justice must be followed.250 It was accepted 
that natural justice may require that the RPO consider giving an undertaking 
where the claimant deems this necessary.251 Despite this, the Court held that as 
the confidentiality undertakings sought were irrevocable, they could not be given 
and K’s right to natural justice was not breached.252 
In the result, the Court dismissed the appeal as the RPO correctly refused the 
limits on disclosure of information that K requested.253 
c) Key takeaways 
It is apparent from a reading of the Immigration Act and case law that New 
Zealand protects the integrity of the refugee system and the confidentiality of 
claims and asylum seeker’s information. In contrast, the South African system is 
more robust in dealing with the competing interests of confidentiality and free 
expression. 
Despite this difference in approach, New Zealand’s refugee law system presents 
an interesting contrast from which we may benefit when applying and 
interpreting domestic legislation. 
South Africa and New Zealand are aligned as to the default position –
confidentiality must be maintained, subject to certain exceptions.254  
Public interest looks quite different for both jurisdictions – in South Africa, it is 
the main countervailing consideration to granting access,255 while in New 
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Zealand it is one of the factors that is considered when determining the 
publication of a decision.256  
Despite this difference in approach, New Zealand does allow for access to be 
granted to the Tribunal’s processes through the publication of its judgments.257 
This allows for the media to access decisions and report on those, which in turn 
allows for the public to have access to information regarding those decisions.258 
Refugee Appeal No. 76299 and Refugee Appeal No. 76297 elucidates the 
underlying principles of publication – accountability259, equal treatment260 and 
fairness261. Publication of decisions is a form of access, although not physical 
access to hearings, and this case is an important one for interpretive purposes. It 
highlights the importance of access and the factors underlying it. These can be 
used in the South African context to motivate for physical access, or simply to 
motivate for the release of the RAA’s judgments if they are withheld.  
In Attorney-General v X and Another, the Court highlighted the importance of 
not protecting asylum seekers who have committed war crimes. This links to the 
principles of international law,262 and the importance of access for the purposes of 
exposing these issues in the public interest.263 While the scope of disclosure was 
limited to officials dealing with the claimant’s extradition or prosecution,264 the 
fact that disclosure was permitted on those grounds is important, and a boon for 
those arguing for access before the RAA. 
In K v Attorney-General (High Court), the Court made the point that even the 
UNHCR opinion did not envisage that the confidentiality obligation would be 
absolute265, and that information regarding the claim could be disclosed to certain 
officials.266  
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Importantly, this case highlighted the importance of ‘RAA-like’ bodies in 
effectively discharging their mandate to uncover the truth of a claim.267 This 
speaks to the principle of open justice and accountability,268 which is key to 
exercising the right to free expression in the public interest.  
This case further highlights that ‘RAA-like’ bodies are empowered to impose 
limits on the disclosure of information, even to other government officials.269 
This may aid in our interpretation of the powers of the RAA, which should be 
empowered to impose limits on the information it releases or allows access to.  
The K v Attorney-General (Court of Appeal) case elaborated on the disclosure of 
information by RAA-equivalent bodies – the body must consider reasonable 
measures to minimise the safety risks.270  
It is important to note, however, that the refugee authority is not entitled to give 
irrevocable undertakings with regard to the disclosure of information, lest the 
courts are hamstrung.271 It illustrates that even in the context of providing 
confidentiality undertakings to refugees, refugee authorities must take into 
account the role of courts and the judicial process.  
This judgment also illustrates that refugee authorities are not required to give 
irrevocable undertakings to claimants when requested to do so.272 The test should 
rather be, when deciding whether to restrict the disclosure of information, to 
determine whether reasonable measures are available to protect the safety of the 
claimant as a result of the disclosure.273  
What we can glean from this case is that the focus should not be on the strict 
protection of information by the refugee authority, but rather on what protection 
can be offered in the event of disclosure to protect the claimant’s safety. This is 
an important principle we can import in our law. The RAA should rather focus on 
the measures it can take to protect the safety of the claimant when determining 
whether to allow access to its hearings. 
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(iii) Canada  
Canada has an expansive and well-organised refugee law system. The governing 
legislation, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act SC 2001, c.27 (‘IRPA’), 
comprehensively covers how claims for asylum are made274, who may make a 
claim,275 the procedure for claims,276 and the cessation or cancellation of 
recognition of refugee status.277  
IRPA also establishes the Immigration and Refugee Board278, which is 
constituted by four separate divisions – the Refugee Protection Division279, the 
Refugee Appeal Division280, the Immigration Division281 and the Immigration 
Appeal Division282.  
a) Governing legislation 
IRPA283 is the principal legislation which governs asylum and refugee-related 
matters in Canada, and in particular, section 166 of that Act governs 
confidentiality.  
Section 166 provides that proceedings before the Refugee Protection Division 
and the Refugee Appeal Division must be conducted ‘in the absence of the 
public’.284 While the default position is the maintenance of the confidentiality of 
the process, there are certain exceptions to the standard rule. These exceptions 
are set out in section 166(d) of IRPA, which provides that -  
‘on application or on its own initiative, the Division may conduct a 
proceeding in public, or take any other measure that it considers necessary to 
ensure the appropriate access to the proceedings if, after having considered 
all available alternate measures and the factors set out in paragraph (b), the 
Division is satisfied that it is appropriate to do so’.285 
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The three factors which the Division must take into account are set out at section 
166(b) of IPRA, which are: whether there is a serious possibility of the life, 
liberty or security of a person being endangered if the proceedings are held in 
public;286 whether the societal interest in the proceeding being public is 
outweighed by the need to prevent disclosure for the fairness of the 
proceedings;287 and whether there is a real and substantial risk that matters 
involving public security will be disclosed.288 
The Refugee Protection Division, established in section 169 of IRPA, is governed 
by the Refugee Protection Division Rules (‘the RPD Rules’).289 The RPD Rules 
provide for confidentiality at Rule 57(12), which grants the Division the 
discretion to take any measures it considers necessary to ensure the 
confidentiality of the proceedings.290  
These measures include the exclusion of the applicant and/or their counsel from a 
hearing whilst the party responding to the application provides evidence,291 and 
requiring the applicant’s counsel to give an undertaking that evidence or 
representation by the respondent will not be disclosed until a decision is made to 
hold the hearing in public.292  
The RPD Rules also provide that a person who makes an application to the 
Division to have a proceeding conducted in public must do so in writing and in 
accordance with Rule 57(2).293 Importantly, the RPD Rules also provide that in 
an application for asylum, the claimant must state whether they want the Division 
to consider the application in public or in the absence of the public and to give 
reasons therefor.294 
The Refugee Appeal Division, which is established in section 171 of IRPA, is 
governed by the Refugee Appeal Division Rules (‘RAD Rules’).295 It mirrors the 
RPD Rules, by providing that applications must state whether the Division 
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should consider the application in private or in public,296 and the reasons therefor, 
and as the Appeal Division is also granted the same discretionary powers to 
ensure the confidentiality of its proceedings.297 
It is clear from a reading of IRPA and the RPD and RAD Rules governing the 
Refugee Protection Division and Refugee Appeal Division that the Canadian 
refugee system mirrors the South African approach. The confidentiality of the 
information and the claimant are well-protected – confidentiality and protection 
are the default position in IRPA298 and the RPD and RAD Rules299, as it is in the 
South African Refugees Act300. However, exceptions to the default are 
permissible.301 
IRPA and the Rules allow for flexibility by allowing the Divisions to exercise 
discretion and permitting the Divisions to deviate from the default.302 The 
exceptions in section 166(d) of IRPA allow for the Division to exercise a 
discretion in allowing access by conducting a hearing in public. Similarly, section 
21(5)(b) of the Refugees Act allows for the RAA to exercise its discretion in 
allowing access.  
Further, one of the factors the RAA is required to take into account in granting 
access is the public interest.303 Similarly, the Refugee Appeal Division is required 
to balance the public interest in a public trial against the need for fair 
proceedings.304 
The Canadian legislation goes one step further than the South African legislation 
in one respect – applications for access. In terms of Rule 57(2) of the Canadian 
RAD Rules, anyone seeking access to the hearings of the Division must bring an 
application. So far, this mirrors the South African approach. However, instead of 
placing the onus solely on the applicant seeking access to make out a case for 
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access, the RAD Rules also provide that the applicant seeking asylum must state 
whether the hearing should be in public or private, and to motivate therefor.305  
While it is understandable that the right of the asylum seeker to have an election 
is a right which seeks to protect and support the asylum seeker, it is also 
important to note that the claimant is required to take a position on the issue of 
access. This is not the South African position – the claimant is not required to 
take a view on the publicity of RAA proceedings.  
While the claimant’s position may contrast with the view taken by the person 
claiming access, the Division will be better placed to fairly decide the issue of 
access once it has both sides of the argument. Further, requiring the claimant to 
state their view may mean that the person seeking access would be able to 
properly answer the case and successfully argue for access. 
b) Case law 
Minister of Public Safety and emergency Preparedness v Josip Budimcic – the 
importance of flexible solutions allowing for the exercise and protection of both 
rights 
This case was a public hearing before the Refugee Protection Division involving 
an application by the Minister to ‘vacate the determination of Convention refugee 
status that was granted’ to Budimcic in 1994.306  
The National Post, a domestic newspaper, applied to have the proceedings of the 
Division open to the public.307 The Division pointed out that there had already 
been a significant amount of media coverage of the case, and Budimcic did not 
object to the hearing being held in public, 308 save that there may be witnesses 
whose identity should be protected.309 The Division took into account the factors 
in section 166(b) of IRPA, and held that none of those factors were present, aside 
from the witnesses identities remaining confidential.310  
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The Division held that the hearing would be held in public, with the exception 
that certain witnesses could give evidence in private and their identities would be 
protected.311 As to the extent of media coverage, the Division reiterated the 
purpose of section 166 of IRPA, to ‘ensure the hearing can continue in a fair and 
orderly fashion, all the while protecting the rights, dignity and privacy of the 
participants’.312 Accordingly, the Division decided that no electronic devices 
would be allowed into the hearing room, including cellphones.313 
Edmonton Journal v Attorney-General, Alberta – the importance of free 
expression for the purposes of accountability and democracy, and 
proportionality of decisions 
The Supreme Court of Canada had to decide whether the impugned section was a 
justifiable limitation on the right of free expression. Section 30 of the Alberta 
Judicature Act prohibited the publication of any detail relating to matrimonial 
proceedings, other than brief details as to the identity of the parties, a brief 
description of the legal submissions, and the court’s findings.314 
The Court recognized the vital importance of the right to express ideas and 
comment on the functioning of public institutions,315 and that it should only be 
‘restricted in the clearest of circumstances’.316 The Court acknowledged that 
freedom of expression is critically important for the functioning of a democratic 
society.317  
The Court added that the rule of law was another important feature of democracy, 
which requires that the courts should function openly318 and be open to public 
scrutiny and criticism.319 The Court put it aptly: ‘the principle that courts must 
function openly is fundamental to our system of justice’.320 Free expression also 
                                                          
311 Budimcic supra at para 9 of Appendix 1. 
312 Budimcic supra at para 11 of Appendix 1. 
313 Budimcic supra at para 12 of Appendix 1. 
314 Edmonton Journal v Alta. (A.G) [1989] 2 S.C.R at 1327. 
315 Edmonton Journal supra at 1336. 
316 Edmonton Journal supra at 1336. 
317 Edmonton Journal supra at 1339. 
318 Edmonton Journal supra at 1339. 
319 Edmonton Journal supra at 1337. 
320 Edmonton Journal supra at 1346. 
59 
 
plays a key role in allowing members of the public to exercise their right to 
freedom of information by accessing information pertaining to the courts.321  
In considering whether the right to free expression is justifiably limited by the 
impugned section, the Court considered whether the limitation was sufficiently 
important to ‘warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom’, 
and whether ‘the means chosen to attain the objectives are proportional or 
appropriate to the ends’.322  
The Court decided that section 30 did not meet the standard of proportionality 
and did not ‘impair the right of freedom of expression as little as possible’.323 The 
impugned section went much further than was necessary to protect the objectives 
it sought to protect.324 It held that the section ‘cannot be said to constitute a 
minimal interference with the right of freedom of expression,’325 as the ‘inroad 
into the right is substantial and significantly reduces the openness of the 
courts’.326  
In coming to its decision, the Court remarked, ‘in today’s society, it is the press 
reports of trials that make the courts truly open to the public… the public’s right 
to know is undeniable’.327 Further, the Court stated that the right to free 
expression is of such paramount importance that ‘an interference with it must be 
of a minimal nature’.328 
Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v Canada – the importance of timely release of 
information for the purposes of democracy, openness, transparency and 
accountability 
In this case, the Supreme Court of Canada had to decide whether a publication 
ban violated the right to free expression.329 It is useful for a discussion on the 
publication of sensitive information in a context outside refugee law. 
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In terms of section 517 of the Criminal Code,330 an accused person is entitled to 
apply for a publication ban on the evidence and information produced and the 
representations made at a bail hearing, as well as any reasons given for the 
order.331 If an accused applies for the ban, a justice of the peace is mandatorily 
required to order the ban in terms of the section.332  
The majority held that the publication ban is justifiable.333 The Court found that 
the validity of a mandatory ban must be determined by assessing its 
proportionality and rationality to ascertain whether it is necessary and justified.334 
The majority held that free expression is a right which can be justifiably limited 
in a free and democratic society.335  
The Court held that the ban was connected to its objectives,336  as it was intended 
to ‘ensure expeditious bail hearings and to safeguard the right to a fair trial’.337 
Further, the Court found that the ban was not absolute or permanent – rather, it 
prohibited distinct categories of information and was discharged at the end of the 
trial.338  
The dissenting judgment found that the mandatory ban is not a justifiable 
infringement of the right to free expression.339 To cure the section, the minority 
judgment suggests that the ban be discretionary, not mandatory.340  
The minority judgment took into account the amount of time between the bail 
hearing and the end of a trial, which could be years.341 This delay amounts to a 
denial of access to information,342 which delay is ‘a profound interference with 
the open court principle’.343  
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On the importance of the open court principle, the dissenting judgment states that 
the public must be able to see the judicial process at work, and their ability to 
meaningfully engage with what a judge says depends on the reasoning behind 
that finding.344 Further, the minority found that public confidence in the judicial 
system requires relevant information to be delivered in a timely manner. To 
mandatorily ban the publication of crucial information when it is of most concern 
and interest to the public is not justified.345 
Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation – the importance of 
reasonability and proportionality in protecting rights  
In this case, the Supreme Court of Canada had to decide on the validity of a 
publication ban which prohibited the broadcast of a mini-series.346  
The respondents applied for an injunction to restrain the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation from broadcasting the mini-series and from publishing any 
information relating to the proposed broadcast.347 The court granted the 
injunction, prohibiting the series from being aired anywhere in Canada. The court 
of appeal approved the injunction but limited its scope, and reversed the order 
banning any publicity relating to the series.348  
The majority held that the publication ban could not be upheld.349 Although it 
was intended to prevent ‘a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial of 
the four respondents’, the initial ban was too broad in its scope.350 The majority 
found that the test for publication bans – whether there is a ‘real and substantial 
risk of interference with the right to a fair trial’ – does not did not sufficiently 
protect the right to free expression.351  
The majority took into account the nature of the expression being limited by the 
ban352 and whether the ban was necessary. The Court found that the ban was not 
necessary as there were reasonable alternative measures which would not have 
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curtailed the right to free expression and would have effectively protected the 
right to a fair trial.353 
The Court suggested that publication bans should be reformulated to take free 
expression into account, as these bans necessarily curtail free expression.354  
The Court suggested that publication bans should be subject to a two-fold test: 
first, is the ban necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk to a fair trial 
because reasonable alternatives will be ineffective, and second: do the benefits of 
the ban outweigh the disadvantages of the ban to the right of free expression?355  
The Court gave further protection to free expression by requiring that the party 
seeking a publication ban must show that the ban is a justifiable limitation on the 
right to free expression.356 Further, they must show that the ban is necessary, that 
there are no other effective remedies, and that the ban is as limited as possible.357 
Finally, the judge is required to weigh the ban and its effect on free expression to 
determine if the ban is proportionate.358 
c) Key takeaways 
While Canadian legislation appears to provide for the strict confidentiality of the 
asylum process, it does allow certain exceptions to the rule. Section 166 of IRPA 
allows for the Refugee Protection Division to allow access to its proceedings on 
application. One of the factors it is required to take into account when allowing 
access is the public interest requirement, that is, ‘whether the societal interest in 
the proceeding being public is outweighed by the need to prevent disclosure for 
the fairness of the proceedings’.359 
Principally, the Canadian asylum system mirrors the approach in domestic 
legislation, which requires that confidentiality should be maintained as a rule, 
save for certain exceptions.  
The Canadian system appears to go further than the South African system in 
providing two additional factors as exceptions to the general rule. These are: 
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whether there is a serious possibility of the life, liberty or security of a person 
being endangered if the proceedings are held in public,360 and whether there is a 
real and substantial risk that matters involving public security will be 
disclosed.361  
The South African system provides that these are factors to be considered when 
determining whether public access should be granted.362 In the Canadian system, 
it appears that these are separate factors which weigh as heavily as the public 
interest factor. In practice, these are competing factors which would be weighed 
separately in the Canadian system. By contrast, in the South African context, 
these are factors which underlie whether the proceeding would be held in public.  
The distinction is minor, but important: the Canadian system recognises public 
interest as an individual consideration which competes against two other equally 
important considerations. In South Africa, public interest and its relative 
importance is determined by the weight given to the underlying factors. That is to 
say, whether or not a matter is in the public interest appears to depend on the 
weight given to the factors the RAA must consider.  
The Canadian refugee system recognises that a matter can be of public interest 
but could simply be outweighed by another consideration and therefore not made 
public.  
This recognises that public interest is an important consideration which stands 
alone, apart from other considerations, and is not dependent on the determination 
of the importance of other considerations for its validity. In the domestic system, 
it would appear that the determination that the validity and importance of public 
interest is not recognised as an end in itself, but is dependent on the relative 
importance and validity of the countervailing considerations.  
Although public interest appears to differ in meaning in Canada and South 
Africa, the Canadian approach would assist with the interpretation of section 
21(5). As has been argued above, the current reading of section 21(5) creates an 
illogical system by tying public interest to the determination of unrelated factors. 
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The Canadian approach separates the issues into logical ‘pockets’ of information 
for analysis by setting public interest as a separate countervailing interest to the 
asylum seekers’ interests. This approach also tends to accord public interest the 
due weight it deserves as a stand-alone consideration to be determined, and not 
simply determined in accordance with other considerations. 
The Budimcic case illustrates that although certain information should be kept 
confidential, the matter could still be heard in public.363 The court in this matter 
was able to recognise and protect the importance of public interest and access as 
well as the confidentiality of witnesses – an indication that discretion can be 
exercised by presiding officials with success. The case also shows that solutions 
requiring a compromise of the rights can (and should) be implemented. These 
solutions must protect the core of the rights but also attempt to limit the right 
only insofar as necessary to protect the competing right. 
South Africa could import this approach into domestic law. The RAA and the 
courts should attempt to find solutions which would be the least intrusive to the 
exercise of a right, where possible. If we accept that both the rights to free 
expression and confidentiality are equally important, there should be a solution 
aimed to protect both rights. This approach may mean that both rights may be 
slightly infringed, but this outcome is preferred because one right is not 
completely infringed at the expense of the other.  
The approach taken by the court in this matter harks back to the argument I made 
in Chapter 3 in the critique of the Chipu case – where possible, a compromise 
between the competing rights should be struck. Where the compromise can 
protect the core of the rights with as little intrusion as possible into either right, 
this should be the preferred approach. 
Edmonton Journal acknowledges the importance of the exercise of free 
expression as it holds public institutions accountable and is key for the 
functioning of a democratic society.364  
Following this reasoning, it is critical for the functioning of the RAA that it be 
held to account for its decisions given that it is a public institution exercising 
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public power. This harks back to the argument I posited in Chapter 3 regarding 
the need for institutions exercising public power to be open, transparent and 
accountable.365  
It is also important for the RAA to make decisions which make as little inroad 
into the right of free expression as is necessary to achieve its ends. When 
interpreting the relevant section and considering applications for access, the RAA 
should be guided by the general principle of proportionality, particularly in 
instances where the right to free expression will be severely limited.  
The judgment serves as a reminder of the importance of the right to free 
expression, and that it is vital for the purposes of accountability and democracy. 
This case mirrors South African law on the issue366, and buoys the argument I 
made Chapter 2 - participatory democracy and accountable and transparent 
governance are all valuable outcomes which justify the protection of the right to 
free expression.367 
The Toronto Star case is an illustration of the importance of the right to 
confidentiality and a restatement that the right to free expression can be 
justifiably limited where necessary.368  
The view I take is in line with the minority judgment.  The minority judgment 
notes the issue with a mandatory ban versus a discretionary ban – the time period 
during which the ban operates could be extensive.369 This would seem to fly in 
the face of accountability of judicial systems and processes, as information would 
not be released when it is of greatest concern to the public.370  
The very purpose of the principle of open justice and transparency is to engender 
free and frank debate, promoting impartiality and guarding against improbity.371 
Further, as I argued in Chapter 3, open justice engenders public debate and 
                                                          
365 See the discussion in Chapter 3 under point (iv)(b)(i) and point (iv)(b)(ii). 
366 See the discussion in Chapter 3 under point (iv)(b)(ii). 
367 See the discussion under point (i)(b) in Chapter 2. 
368 Toronto Star supra at 723. 
369 Toronto Star supra at 726. 
370 Toronto Star supra at 763. 
371 High Court Chipu at para 11, quoting Mamabolo supra at paras 28-29 and Scott supra at 447. 
66 
 
allows matters to become part of the public discourse. It is instrumental to 
upholding the principles of a constitutional democracy.372  
It should follow that for there to be frank debate on issues and for there to be 
accountability, the underlying information should be provided in a timely 
manner. There would be little point in the public becoming appraised of a matter, 
for example, ten years after its inception. This would not lead to fruitful debate 
on current issues, nor would institutions be held to account for their decisions in a 
timely and meaningful manner. This would fly in the face of the principles of 
participatory democracy, openness and transparency. 
While I advocate for the approach taken by the minority judgment, there may be 
value in the imposition of a temporary or partial ban on access or reporting on 
RAA hearings. If necessary, a partial or time-sensitive ban on RAA proceedings 
may be imposed where this would lead to the least inroad into either right. If the 
right to free expression must be limited in a certain situation, it should be limited 
as little as possible for as short a time as possible.  
 This may be an approach which the RAA could adopt – the release of certain 
information at the expiration of a reasonable time period. It may be a less 
invasive solution to allow delayed ‘access’ whilst still protecting the right to 
confidentiality. This may raise issues of timeliness, however, as noted in the 
minority judgment, which is a valid concern. 
The case of Dagenais showed that bans can be justifiably limited in their scope 
where the ban fails to sufficiently protect the right to free expression. This case is 
an interesting foil to the decision of the majority in the Toronto Star case, which 
held that publication bans are a justifiable limitation on the right to free 
expression.373  
Dagenais also illustrates that where reasonable alternative measures are available 
which would effectively protect the competing right of a fair trial without 
curtailing the right to free expression, this should to be preferred.374 This harks 
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back to the views I posited in Chapters 2375 and 3376 – the preferred outcome 
should be that the one which causes the least inroad into either right.  
The court also formulated a test for whether a ban on access should be imposed – 
whether the ban is necessary because alternatives will be ineffective, and whether 
the benefits of the ban outweigh its disadvantages.377 This is a well-formulated 
test which the RAA may consider applying when determining whether to ban 
access to its proceedings.  
(v) Conclusion  
Although the asylum-seeking systems in New Zealand and Canada differ from 
the South African approach, it is clear that both systems can assist in the 
interpretation of the amended section 21(5) of the Refugees Act.  
Both New Zealand and Canada have considered public access to ‘RAA-like’ 
bodies’ hearings based on public interest and their judgments consider both sides 
of the issue – access and denial. Although these judgments and statutes are not 
binding as they are foreign law, it is still useful to have regard to decisions from 
jurisdictions which have dealt with similar issues.  
It was aptly put by Chaskalson P in S v Makwanyane: ‘we can derive assistance 
from public international law and foreign case law, but we are in no way bound 
to follow it’.378  
The RAA and the courts would benefit from similar bodies which have grappled 
with similar issues when interpreting and applying section 21(5) of the Refugees 
Act.  
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V. Conclusion  
(i) Introduction 
The rights of free expression and confidentiality are diametrically opposed – one 
seeks to expose information, the other to keep information private. Each right has 
sound reasoning underpinning it and each right is backed by weighty 
jurisprudential argument stating its importance. Even though each right is equally 
important, in the event of a clash between the two, it is inevitable that the 
exercise and full scope of one right would be compromised.  
When these rights compete in the context of refugee law, the fact that they are 
diametrically opposed is more pronounced. Confidentiality has the effect of 
chilling free expression for the purpose of protecting the asylum system and the 
asylum seeker. The right to free expression has the effect of exposing information 
about the asylum system, the asylum seeker and the RAA for the purposes of 
(among others) openness, transparency and accountability and aiding public 
debate in a democracy.379  
The stakes for asylum seekers and their families and associates are high where 
the confidentiality of their application is not maintained. Similarly, the stakes for 
the media and society are high when the entire asylum adjudication process is 
cloaked in secrecy and confidentiality. It is therefore necessary to strike a delicate 
balance between the two competing rights, particularly in the context of refugee 
law.  
The purpose of this thesis was to assist with the RAA’s exercise of discretion in 
determining which right should be favoured in the event of a clash between the 
opposing rights in the refugee context. More specifically, this thesis sought to 
formulate an understanding the importance of free expression in the context of 
asylum proceedings.  
                                                          
379 See the discussion on these issues in Chapter 2 under point (i)(b) and Chapter 3 (iv)(b)(i) and (ii). 
69 
 
(ii) On the jurisprudence of the rights 
The jurisprudential underpinnings of the rights were canvassed earlier380 to 
determine why they are protected, and how to give effect to and better protect 
these rights.  
The right to free expression is a right which has value both intrinsically and 
instrumentally.  
The instrumentality argument is important in this context – particularly given the 
facts of the Chipu case. Academics like Emerson, Dworkin, Stone and Mill have 
commented on the importance of free expression as instrumental to the purposes 
of, among others, democracy; self-fulfilment and an informed citizenry.381 The 
media is a key feature in the realisation and fulfilment of each of these ends – it 
allows a free flow of information and a provides access thereto for millions of 
people.382  
Aside from the argument that the right to free expression is an instrumental right, 
in which the media is a key player by allowing for those rights to be realised, 
there is also the argument that media freedom is intrinsically important. Several 
Constitutional Court judgments highlight the importance of the media in 
upholding and protecting the right to free expression.383 These judgments speak 
to the importance of the media as a ‘watchdog’ and as agents who ensure an 
open, responsive and accountable government.384  
The right to confidentiality for asylum seekers is integral to their safety. It is 
important to create an environment for asylum seekers where they are assured 
that the information they share will be treated as confidential and with respect. In 
the spirit of UNHCR opinions and the Refugee Convention, the right of 
confidentiality is central to asylum-seeking processes. 
Protecting the right to confidentiality means that the integrity of the asylum 
process is maintained, and allows for the full ventilation of information by the 
asylum seeker, as well as protecting the asylum seeker, his or her family and 
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associates. Taking into account the nature of the risks inherent in the asylum-
seeking process for the asylum seeker and his or her family and associates, as 
well as the importance of maintaining the integrity of the system, it is clear that 
media access to RAA hearings may, if not properly managed, cause harm to the 
people involved.  
(iii) On the balancing of the opposing rights 
The media has sometimes come under criticism for its portrayal of events and 
people, and there are sometimes accusations of ‘trials by media’, where bias is 
shown toward certain people and versions of events. With the advent of greater 
connectivity in an age of technological advances, more media sources and greater 
access to those sources by more people than before, there is a heavy burden on 
the media to report content in a manner which is sensitive to, and does not 
violate, others’ rights.  
Media coverage and reports must be well managed and should be sensitive to the 
needs of the asylum system and asylum seekers. While it is crucial that free 
expression is protected and exercised, the right to free expression cannot simply 
be exercised in an unfettered manner. The risks for the asylum system and 
asylum seekers, their family and associates if information is reported incorrectly 
or if highly sensitive material is reported are too high to justify an unlimited 
exercise of the right to free expression.  
The limitation of public interest provided for in the amended section 21(5) of the 
Refugees Act is a good guide for the media and the RAA to decide whether to 
allow media access to RAA hearings. The considerations in section 21(5)(b) are 
enquiries to determine whether a matter should be reported and whether, if access 
is granted to the media, certain information should be redacted, anonymised or 
not disclosed for the protection of the asylum seeker and the integrity of the 
system.  
It is argued that the test of whether a matter is in the public interest must be 
separated from the enquiries in section 21(5)(b). This distinction may mean that 
where a matter is determined to be in the public interest, but the asylum seeker 
has a great interest in retaining confidentiality, then the RAA should not allow 
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the existence of this sole factor to militate against allowing the access to its 
proceedings.  
A matter can be in the public interest but may not be reported because of the 
weight given to the factors in section 21(5)(b). Similarly, a matter may not be in 
the public interest at all but can meet the factors in section 21(5)(b). I accept for 
the purposes of this argument that where a matter is not in the public interest, 
access will not be granted by virtue of the operation of the public interest 
limitation, which is the ultimate consideration.  
The purpose of the above contrast is to show that the enquiry into whether a 
matter is in the public interest is not necessarily linked to the enquiries in section 
21(5)(b)385. The enquiry into whether something is in the public interest cannot 
hinge on the factors listed in that section. Public interest is a consideration which 
has its own jurisprudence and its own countervailing jurisprudential 
considerations.  
It would make little sense to determine that a matter is not in the public interest 
simply because the asylum seeker has an interest in retaining confidentiality, for 
example. This would not render the matter not to be of public interest, but may 
count against granting media access. Further, this narrow interpretation would 
unnecessarily limit the right to free expression.  
Whilst it is true that the right to free expression cannot be fully realised in this 
context, it also should not be that the right to free expression should always 
necessarily be the right which is compromised. As argued above, the right to free 
expression cannot sometimes be fully realised in the refugee context because of 
the sensitivity required and the magnitude of the risks to the asylum seeker and 
the asylum system which may exist.  
In determining whether to allow the media access to its proceedings, the RAA 
should first consider whether the matter is in the public interest. In determining 
this, the RAA could consider the public interest factors discussed in Chapter 3 of 
this thesis.  
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These considerations included international criminal law and the need for 
transparency in the asylum process.386 Section 4(1)(a) of the Refugees Act 
excludes those believed to have committed crimes under international criminal 
law from obtaining refugee status.387 This protects against abuse of the asylum 
system and ensures that those who have, or who are believed to have, committed 
grave crimes are not protected by the asylum system.388  
Allowing access into RAA proceedings would allow a light to be shone into 
RAA processes to determine whether this principle is being upheld. Further, it is 
of great concern that the public are made aware of those who are seeking access 
to the country. 
Another public interest factor to be considered are the principles of open justice 
and participatory democracy.389 The aim of these principles is to promote the 
accountability of courts, transparency and impartiality.390 These principles serve 
to ensure free and frank debate that is robust and informed. The RAA, as a quasi-
judicial body, should invite public scrutiny for these purposes. 
Once the RAA has determined that something is in the public interest, it should 
then consider whether access should be granted to its proceedings in light of the 
factors of section 21(5)(b)(i)-(vi).391 Where a number of the factors are present, 
or there are weighty considerations in relation to one or more of them, access 
should be denied. Where the public interest considerations outweigh those 
factors, access should be granted.  
However, where it is possible to accommodate both the right to free expression 
and the right to confidentiality, this should be preferred. Even though a 
compromise would mean that neither right would be fully protected or exercised, 
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it would be the preferred solution as it would lead to the least inroad into the 
other right.  
(iv) On lessons from foreign law 
Chapter 4 of this thesis provided an analysis of foreign law decisions in New 
Zealand and Canada on the right to free expression in the context of refugee law 
and how ‘RAA-equivalent’ bodies in those jurisdictions exercised their discretion 
to allow or deny media access.  
Foreign law has shown that compromises can be used successfully – that is, the 
manner of access and coverage and information reported can be limited to allow 
for protection of the asylum seeker and the asylum process.392  
The New Zealand asylum-seeking system is geared more toward the protection of 
the right to confidentiality than the right to free expression.393 However, the 
system allows for the publication of Tribunal decisions where this would be in 
the public interest.394 The decisions also recognised the importance of sharing 
information relating to the asylum seeker’s alleged international criminal law 
offences for the purposes of preventing abuse of the asylum system.395  
The decisions also spoke to the principles of openness and transparency and 
showed that RAA-like bodies are empowered to impose limits on the disclosure 
of information, even to other government officials.396 This may aid in our 
interpretation of the powers of the RAA, which would be empowered to impose 
limits on the information it releases or allows access to.  
Finally, its decisions showed that the focus should not be on the strict protection 
of information by the refugee authority, but rather on what protection can be 
offered in the event of disclosure to protect the claimant’s safety.397 The RAA 
should rather focus on the measures it can take to protect the core of an asylum 
claim – the safety of the claimant. 
                                                          
392 See the discussion under points (i)(c) and (ii)(c) of Chapter 4, which extracts the lessons from New 
Zealand and Canada respectively. 
393 See this discussion under point (i)(a) of Chapter 4. 
394 Section 151(4)(b) of the New Zealand Immigration Act, Act 51 of 2009. 
395 Attorney-General supra, discussed in Chapter 4 under point (i). 
396 K (High Court) supra and K (Court of Appeal) supra, discussed in Chapter 4 under point (i). 
397 K (Court of Appeal) supra, discussed in Chapter 4 under point (i).  
74 
 
The Canadian system appears to mirror the South African system – it does, 
however, appear to go further than the domestic asylum system in its protection 
of the right to free expression.398 The rules provide that the asylum seeker must 
take a view on the issue of access and motivate as to whether a hearing should be 
public or private.399 While this seeks to protect the asylum seeker, it is also 
important that the asylum seeker is required to motivate as to whether his or her 
hearing should be public or private.  
Further, the Canadian system recognises public interest as a separate 
consideration which competes against two other equally important 
considerations.400 Domestically, public interest and its relative importance is 
seemingly determined by the weight given to the underlying factors.  
The Canadian decisions show that it is possible to retain the confidentiality of 
key figures, but still allow the hearing to be conducted in public.401 The existence 
of a competing factor to public interest does not necessarily render public access 
impossible, and compromises can be implemented. The decisions also recognise 
the importance of holding public institutions accountable for the purposes of 
democracy and transparency.402 
The approach adopted in certain decisions also showed that the RAA may allow 
for delayed access.403 Although this is not the ideal position, it is less invasive 
than denying access.404 This may raise issues of information being obtained and 
disseminated in a timely manner, but this may be a solution to ensure that time-
sensitive and other confidential material could be released in a way that protects 
the asylum seeker but still allows access to a certain extent.  
The decisions also reiterated the importance of proportionality and 
reasonableness.405 Bodies exercising a public power, like the RAA, should be 
guided by these fundamental principles of decision-making. A court also 
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formulated a test for whether a ban on access should be imposed – first, is the ban 
necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk to a fair trial because reasonable 
alternatives will be ineffective, and second: do the benefits of the ban outweigh 
the disadvantages of the ban to the right of free expression?406  
 This is a well-formulated test which the RAA may consider applying when 
determining whether to deny (that is, ban) access to its proceedings. 
(v) Final thoughts 
Though carefully crafted, the Chipu judgment and the amended section 21(5) 
provide for an unprecedented power for the RAA to exercise. It also provides a 
new portal of access for the press and a concomitant duty to report with 
sensitivity.  
The purpose of this research was to understand the underpinnings of the rights to 
free expression and confidentiality; to analyse how they have been dealt with in 
the Chipu judgments; and to learn from decisions made by bodies similar to the 
RAA in New Zealand and Canada. 
This research has shown that there are no clear-cut answers or arguments which 
support that one right should always be preferred over the other. The rights must 
be balanced, and the RAA should take into account the extensive and detailed 
arguments underlying the rights; the manner in which the rights were treated by 
the High Court and the Constitutional Court; and foreign law on the issue.  
Above all, the RAA must carefully consider applications for access in light of the 
above considerations – solutions which prefer a compromise of the two rights 
should be preferred, where possible. 
Despite the relative dearth of domestic academic opinion and case law on the 
right to free expression in the context of asylum-seeking, there is sufficient 
guidance for the RAA to exercise its discretion if it has regard to the wealth of 
knowledge on the individual rights and if it looks to foreign law for guidance 
where there are lacunae.  
In sum, this aspect of domestic jurisprudence requires clarity, which will 
necessarily develop through the testing of the right in the context of refugee law. 
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Until this area of law is further developed, there is sufficient available guidance 
to enable the RAA to reach an informed decision when exercising its discretion 
to allow the media access to its proceedings.  
It is hoped that this research has aided in forming a cohesive understanding of the 
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Problems in Africa 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Adopted 26 June 1981) 
American Convention on Human Rights (Adopted 22 November 1969) 
Canada Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c.27 
Canada Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257 
Canada Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2012-256 
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 
European Convention on Human Rights (Adopted 4 November 1950) 
European Council: Council of the European Union, Council Directive on 
Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting and 
Withdrawing Refugee Status (2 January 2006) 
Guidelines on International Protection No. 5: Application of the 
Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees, 4 September 2003 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN General 
Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI), 16 December 1966 
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New Zealand Bill of Rights, 1990 
New Zealand Immigration Act, Act 51 of 2009 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Advisory Opinion (7 
May 2002) 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Advisory Opinion on 
the Rules of Confidentiality regarding Asylum Information (31 March 
2005) 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Guidelines (2003) 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 217A (III), 10 December 1948 
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